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FURTHERING AMERICAN FREEDOM: CIVIL
RIGHTS & THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
ALEXANDER TSESIS*

Abstract: This Article discusses why the Thirteenth Amendment's reach
extends beyond the institution of slavery and has important implications
for civil liberties. The Amendment-in providing a mechanism to protect
findamental rights articulated in the Declaration of Independence and
Preamble to the Constitution-not only ended slavery, but also created a
substantive assurance of freedom. This Article reviews Thirteenth Amendmentjurisprudence and shows that, despite substantial narrowing after its
adoption, the Amendment is a source of sweeping constitutional power
for enacting federal civil rights legislation. The Article also distinguishes
congressional power nnder the Thirteenth Amendment from that under
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, demonstrating
that the Thirteenth Amendment is a viable, and at times preferable, alternative for civil rights reforms. Finally, the Article suggests that recent U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence limiting congressional Commerce Clause
and Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 powers has increased the importance of the Thirteenth Amendment as an alternative strategy for civil
rights legislation and litigation.
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INTRODUCTION

The Thirteenth Amendment's significance extends beyond the
abolition of slavery.1 It grants the federal government the authority to
prevent any contemporary civil rights abuses associated with involntary servitude. The South's peculiar institution interfered with far more
than slaves' economic welfare. At a more specific level, owners pre-

vented slaves from making independent parental decisions, choosing
spouses, or freely traveling off plantations. The scope of the Thirteenth
Amendment concerns these and other interferences against autonomy,

and in many cases provides Congress with authority to prevent them.
My contention is that the Thirteenth Amendment ended all aspects of

slavery which spread far outside the boundaries of plantation husbandry into interstate commerce, government fiscal policy, and private
sales transactions.

2

The Thirteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
2 After the Civil War, Radical Republicans tied the end of slavery to increased protections of labor in general. Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts explained that slavery
degraded white and black working people: "I tell you, sir, that the man who is the enemy of
the black laboring man is the enemy of the white laboring man the world over. The same
influences that go to keep down and crush down the rights of the poor black man bear
down and oppress the poor white laboring man." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343
(1866). Representative George Julian, who like Wilson was an unflinching abolitionist and
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Radical Republicans, who were the driving force behind the Thirteenth Amendment, expected it to end all injustices related to involuntary servitude.3 They planted the Amendment's roots in the Declaration of Independence and Preamble to the Constitution, which left
the task of fleshing out the ideal of universal freedom to later generations. The Thirteenth Amendment's first section guarantees the freedom from arbitrary domination, and its second section empowers
Congress to enact legislation protecting people's coequal liberty to establish meaningful lives. In this regard, the Thirteenth Amendment
was both a new beginning for the nation and a constructive means for
enforcing its foundational principles of liberty and general wellbeing.
The Amendment made the United States' founding aspiration of
equal liberty an enforceable right. 4
The historical context of the Thirteenth Amendment is the abolitionist movement and the nation's decision to throw off its racist past.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, both the federal government's recalcitrance to use the Amendment and Southern evasion of it necessitated the ratification of two additional Reconstruction Amendments. 5
Even then, reform was slow in coming.

advocate of free labor, regarded corporate exploitation as a problem existing side by side
with slavery "The rights of men are sacred, whether trampled down by southern slavedrivers, the monopolists of the soil, the grinding power of corporate wealth, the legalized
robber), of a protective tariff, or the power of concentrated capital in alliance with laborsaving machinery." GEORGE W. JULIAN, POLrIMCAL RECOLLECTIONS, 1840 TO 1872, at 322-

23 (Negro University Press 1970) (1884).
3 See RobertJ. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights
After the Civil War, 92 Am. HisT. REv. 45, 47-48 (1987) (explaining that congressional Republicans expected the Thirteenth Amendment to enable Congress to pass laws protecting
natural rights); Barry Sullivan, HistoricalReconstruction. Reconstruction History, and the Proper
Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541, 564 (1989) (indicating that the Thirty-Ninth Congress
intended the Thirteenth Amendment to end private as well as public discrimination); Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consummation to
Abolition and Key to the FourteenthAmendment, 39 CAL. L. REv. 171, 174-75 (1951) (explaining
how the Thirteenth Amendment extended the federal legislative powers into matters that
had previously been left to the states); Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A
Thirteenth Amendment Approach, 75 TPp. L. REv. 539, 560-76 (2002) (providing a detailed
study of congressional debates preceding passage of the proposed Thirteenth Amendment); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. RE%'.
437, 440 (1989) (stating that, "[iln addition to purely labor-based concerns, the thirteenth
amendment debates reflected themes such as racial equality, the importance of access to
education, the integrity of families, and the natural rights of mankind").
4 SeeJames E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1335,
1350-51 (1997) (discussing the importance of aspirational principles to constitutional
fidelity).
5U.S. CONST. amends. XIV,XV.
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After years of narrow judicial construction, which made the Thirteenth Amendment a dead letter in all but peonage cases, the United
States Supreme Court revisited the Amendment's meaning during the
heyday of the civil rights movement.6 The landmark Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co. decision determined that the Thirteenth Amendment extends beyond uncompensated, forced labor. In fact, the A]-nendment's
second section enables Congress to pass federal legislation that is rationally related to ending any remaining badges and incidents of servitude, such as present-day trafficking of foreign workers as sex slaves
and coerced domestic servants. 7 The judiciary's role in evaluating
such legislation is to determine whether Congress has overstepped its
Section 2 enforcement authority. The judiciary's interpretation must
be partially historical, because it cannot be made without reference to
the United States' experience with slavery, and partially theoretical,
because it must chart the course for civil liberties.
Even though the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified in 1865, its
jurisprudence is relatively nascent. Rules should develop in this field
as in other areas of common law. Issues will appear before judges
whose holdings will be based on the extant precedents and on constitutional integrity. Further developments will test the reasoning of
lower court decisions. The role of theory in this process is to scrutinize the current topography and articulate a sense of direction in this
relatively uncharted territory.
Contemporary civil rights initiatives have predominantly relied
on the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Meanwhile, the Thirteenth Amendment has fallen into virtual disuse. Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, such as United States v. Aforiison and United States v. Lopez, have eroded Fourteenth Amendment

6Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440-41 (1968); see Anti-Peonage Act, 14
Stat. 546 (1867). Justice David Brewer defined peonage "as a status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master. The basal fact is
indebtedness." Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905); see Pollock v. Williams, 322
U.S. 4, 17 (1944) ("[tlhe undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented
by the Anti-peonage Act was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States"); United States v. Reynolds,
235 U.S. 133, 146, 148-50 (1914) ("[clompulsion of such service by the constant fear of
imprisonment tinder the criminal laws" violates the Thirteenth Amendment); Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (finding a statute that compels labor to work off debt
an unconstitutional form of peonage that violated the Thirteenth Amendment).
7 See Mayer, 392 U.S. at 440-41.
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and Commerce Clause precedents and spurred interest in Thirteenth
Arnendment jurisprudence. 8
This Article examines what fundamental rights are protected by
the Thirteenth Amendment. The Amendment is a potent constitutional provision that the Supreme Court has interpreted as a means for
protecting fundamental rights. The Thirteenth Amendment is uniquely
suited to confront civil rights violations that neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Commerce Clause can prevent. Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, which only protects against state-sponsored discrimination, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits private and public
acts resulting in arbitrary deprivations of freedom. 9 This dual capacity
makes the Thirteenth Amendment an essential complement for civil
rights initiatives, even in circumstances not involving economic harms.' 0
In that respect, the Thirteenth Amendment also provides a more
direct approach to preventing discrimination than does the Commerce Clause. It is directed against human rights abuses, whereas the
Commerce Clause is primarily an economic provision that has been
grafted ingeniously into the civil rights arena." As a pragmatic matter,
8 See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (discussing Congress's power tinder the Commerce Clause).
9 SeeThe Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) ("[T]he [Thirteenth A]mendment is
not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United
States."); Jack Balkin, History Lesson, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug. 2002, at 44, 49 (stating that the
Thirteenth Amendment, like the Citizenship Clause, does not refer to state actions, and
therefore applies to private conduct); Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment
and Slavery in the Global Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 973, 1007 (2002) (asserting that because the Thirteenth Amendment lacks a state action requirement, it places substantive
restrictions on "private social and economic relationships"). The Fourteenth Amendment's
state action requirement is not new. It can be traced to postbellum cases. See, e.g., Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (finding that the Civil Rights Act of 1875's prohibition against social
discrimination on public accommodations violated the state action requirement); United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1882) (holding Congress exceeded its Fourteenth
Amendment Section 5 power when it passed a section of the Ku Klux Klan Act, "[a]s... the
section of the law under consideration is directed exclusively against the action of private
persons, without reference to the laws of the State or their administration by her officers, we
are clear in the opinion that it is not warranted by any clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution"). Congress can prevent private party acts when individuals commit them in cooperation with the state. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, 798-99
(1966). More recently, the Court has reiterated the state action requirement in striking
down the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620-21.
10 The Thirteenth Amendment can offer courts more guidance and provide legislators
with added certainty.
11 See ALEXANDER TSESIs, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT & AMERICAN FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY, ch. 6 (forthcoming Sept. 2004) (distinguishing between the Thirteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause).
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the Supreme Court's recently increased oversight of congressional
Conuerce Clause authority has made the Thirteenth Amendment
12
even more important.
This Article begins with a retrospective look at why the Thirteenth Amendment so drastically altered the Constitution by showing
that before its ratification, civil liberty was limited by the basic right of
possession.' 3 As a result, even human lives were conceptualized in
commodification terms. Protecting slave owners' interest in human
chattel was even more important to the delegates of the Philadelphia
Constitutional Convention than adopting the Bill of Rights. The
Three-Fifths Clause, the Fugitive Slave Clause, and the twenty-year
protection on slave importation held more practical importance in
drafting an acceptable constitution than protecting speech, liberty, or
life. In fact, the Thirteenth Amendment went even further than the
Bill of Rights in securing the privileges and inmmunities of citizenship.
The Article then explores the extent to which the Thirty-Eighth Congress, in 1864 and 1865, planned for14the proposed Amendment to
create protections for universal liberty.
Next, the Article explains the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Thirteenth Amendment, beginning with its restrictive decisions
issued in the aftermath of Reconstruction and continuing through5
the Court's most recent pronouncements involving the Amendment.'
The Article then analyzes Court decisions limiting congressional
Commerce Clause authority in passing civil rights reforms and explains why those limitations are inapplicable to the Thirteenth
Amendment. 16 Correspondingly, the Article discusses holdings relying
on federalism to limit the scope of Congress's power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment and distinguishes the statutory spheres

12 See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 ("We accordingly reject the argument that Con-

gress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's
aggregate effect on interstate commerce."); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (holding Congress
may regulate three areas of commerce: "channels of interstate commerce"; "instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities"; and "those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce").
13 See infra Part I.
14See infra Part II.
15See infra Part III.
16 See infra Part IV. The Court recently found Congress overstepped its Commerce
Clause authority on several occasions. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619 (discussing the Violence
Against Women Act); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (discussing the Gun Free School Zones Act).
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of the Fourteenth and Thirteenth Amendments.' 7 The Article concludes with a historical and theoretical analysis of how the Thirteenth
Amendment fits with existing privacy and liberty rights case law.'8
I. CONSTITUTION BEFORE THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

Understanding how antithetical slavery was to United States ideals is a staring point to comprehending slavery's fill effect on the
Constitution. The revolutionary generation was engrossed with creating a free republic. The Sons of Liberty rallied colonists against taxation without representation; Liberty Polls were assembly places; Patrick Henry embodied the revolutionary project in his pithy statement
"Give me liberty or give me death"; and Thomas Paine believed America to be "the place where the principle of universal freedom could
take root."19 Slavery was so incompatible with colonial aspirations that
revolutionaries often declared they were under the British yoke of
slavery) 20 Yet, revolutionaries turned a blind eye to the widespread enslavement of Africans and Native Americans. 2 1 The first U.S. Supreme
Court Chief Justice, John Jay, later recalled that even among Northerners, "very few ... doubted the propriety and rectitude of" slavery.22

17Recent cases limiting Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 powers have dealt with a ,ariety of subjects. See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001)
(holding that Congress was not authorized under Section 5 to require states to abide by
the terms of the Americans with Disabilities Act because it infringed on state sovereign immunity); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (stating that that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act contains "a clear statement of Congress' intent to
abrogate the States' immunity, but that the abrogation exceeded Congress' [constitutional] authority"); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-19, 535-36 (1997) (determining that "appropriate legislation" in Section 5 means that Congress can only pass remedial legislation that "deters or remedies constitutional violations," but does not allow
Congress to create constitutional rights).
18 See infra Part V.
19
JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LIBERTY 23-25 (1982); FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL

ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITlTION 10

(1985); Eric Foner, The Meaning of Freedom in theAge of Emancipation, 81 J. AM. HIsT. 435, 439
(1994) (stating Paine's position on creating a free republic).
2o See BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 289-91 (1994).

21 See William Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations,Reconciliation. and an American Indian PleaforPeae with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 21-22 (20022003) (discussing the enslavement of Native Americans in the colonies).
22 William W. Freehling, The Founding Fathers and Slavery, 77 AM. HIST. REV. 81, 86
(1972) (quotingJohn Jay). Nevertheless, the revolution altered that dynamic in the North,
partly because slavery was an economic liability and partly because of Northern politicians'
realization that continued exploitation of slaves was hypocritical to the revolutionary project. See id.
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The independence movement, particularly its New England contingent, began to recognize that the implication of its vision extended
to blacks as well. Among its ranks were those who sought gradual
emancipation, such as John Adams, the nation's second president,
and those who demanded immediate liberation, such as Nathaniel
23
Appleton, a member of the first Committee on Correspondence.
The 1774 Rhode Island law prohibiting slave importation proclaimed
that, among rights and liberties, "personal freedom must be considered as the greatest."24 Black leaders and some of their white counterparts, such as James Otis, recognized the opportunity to end slavery
offered by the Revolution. 25 A group of black New Hampshire petitioners used natural rights terminology to make the point "[tihat
freedom is an inherent right of the human species ... [and t] hat pri-

vate or public tyranny and slavery are alike detestable." 26 Similarl); on
April 20, 1773, black petitioners from Massachusetts expressed their
expectation of "great things from men who have made such a noble
stand against the designs of their fellow-imen to enslave them."27 That
same year, blacks from Boston and other Massachusetts provinces petitioned for relief from the manifold burdens placed on them by New
England slavery, decrying their lack of property, wives, children, city,
and country.2 8 Individuals of African descent helped shape such revolutionary rhetoric. Lemuel Haynes, a racially mixed minister, wrote

2- LorenzoJ. Greene, Slave-Holding New England and Its Awakening, 13J. NEGRO HIST.
492, 524 (1928) (discussing John Adams's and Nathaniel Appleton's respective stances on
slavery).
24

WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATnTUDES TOWARD THE NE-

1550-1812, at 291 (1968) (quoting the preamble to the Rhode Island law); seeJohn
M. Mecklin, The Evolution of the Slave Status in American Democracy, 2 J. NEGRO HIST. 105,
121 (1917) (mentioning the Rhode Island law). Rhode Island legislators, nevertheless,
considered blacks to be the equals of Native Americans, but not of white colonists. F.
GRO,

Nwabueze Okoye, Chattel Slavery as the Nightmare of the American Revolution, 37 WM. & MARY

Q. 3,2525 (1980).

James Otis considered both blacks and whites free and equal colonists. See Rosalie
Murphy Baum, Early-American Literature: Reassessing the Black Contribution, 27 EIGHTEENTHCENTURY STUD. 533, 546-47 (1994); T.H. Breen, Subjecthood and Citizenship: The Context of
James Otis's Radical Critique of John Locke, 71 NEw ENGL. Q. 378, 390 (1998) (comparing
Otis's philosophical outlook with that of John Locke). The ownership of humans, Otis
declared, "has a direct tendency to diminish the idea of the inestimable value of liberty."
Louis Hartz, Otis andAnti-Slavery Doctrine, 12 NEw. ENGL. Q. 745, 746 (1939).
26
JORDAN, supra note 24, at 291.
27Thomas J. Davis, Emancipation Rhetoric, NaturalRights, and Revolutionary A England:
A Note on FourBlackPetitions in Massachusetts, 1773-1777,62 NEw ENG. Q. 248, 255 (1989).
28 Id. at 252.
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that "an Affican, or, in other terms, ... a Negro, ... has an undeniable
right to his Liberty."29
The ideal of universal freedom that many activists embraced relied on the philosophy of John Locke. Locke's natural rights theory
made its way into the Declaration of Independence, but it did not end
slavery. 30 The Declaration adopted Locke's statement of inalienable
human rights, unbeholden to positive laws.31 But the founding generation of American revolutionaries lived with the contradictory promises
of civil freedom and property rights in human chattel. In Thomas Jefferson's original draft of the Declaration, his accusations against King
George included a clause condemning the British monarch for acting
"against human nature itself" by keeping open an international slave
trade that violated the "rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people."32 South Carolina, which repeatedly appeared as a leader
in the antebellum proslavery camp, opposed the clause, and the language was not retained in the Declaration's final draft. 33
In the decades between the ratification of the country's founding
documents and the Thirteenth Amendment, the Declaration's universal guarantee of freedom posed a moral dilemma for politicians and
citizens who tolerated and participated in an institution contrary to
core national commitments. Even without Jefferson's proposed antiimportation passage, the Declaration of Independence established liberty as a primary national aspiration.3 4 Its terms created the rhetorical
9 Ruth Bogin, "Liberty FurtherExtended ": A 1776 Antislavery Manuscript by Lenucl Haynes,
40 Wm.& MARY Q. 85, 92 (1983).
30 See HERBERT FRIEDENWALD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 201-03 (Da Capo
Press 1974) (1904);JEROME HUYLER, LOCKE IN AMERICA: THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE
FOUNDING ERA 209-11, 246-50 (1995); WILLARD STERNE RANDALL, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A
LIFE 205 (1993); MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 61-78
(1978); Donald Doernberg, "We the Pcople".John Locke, Collective ConstitutionalRights, and
Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 65 (1985); Terry Kogan, A NeoFederalist Tale of PersonaIJurisdiction,63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 307 (1990). But see GARRY
WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 172-75 (1978)
(arguing that Locke did not influence writing of Declaration of Independence).
31 See, e.g., 2 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 22 (Peter Laslett ed.,

Mentor Press 1997) (1689).
32
Tania Tetlow, The Founders & Slavery: A Crisis of Conscience,3 Loe.J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 11
(2001) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Thomas Jefferson's original draft of the
Declaration of Independence).
33WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE REINTEGRATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY: SLAVERY AND

THE CIVIL WAR 26 (1994) (discussing South Carolina's opposition).
s4SeeJOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 85 (5th ed. 1980) ("The implications of the Declaration, however vague, were so powerful that Southern slave owners
found it desirable to deny the self-evident truths which it expounded and were willing to
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dilemma of denying the otherwise universal right of freedom to per5
sons of African descent.3
The wording of the Declaration was so general, without any accompanying philosophical or policy explanation, that it only gained a
definitively antislavery significance during the Thirteenth Amendment's ratification process. Until then, there were two differing camps
of thought. Shortly after the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment,
Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, one of its leading protagonists, embraced a perspective claiming that the Founding Fathers postponed
fully instituting the Declaration's principles until "a more propitious
time."3 6 Stevens echoed the view adopted by a variety of antislavery
parties before the Civil War. For instance, the Liberty Party's 1844
platform asserted that the Declaration's principle that all men are endowed with inalienable rights, including liberty, was embodied in the
37
Fifth Amendment's national protections of life, liberty, and property.
Because slavery deprived persons of all three without any due process
of law, the Liberty Party's platform declared that the institution was
"against natural rights."3 8
The Republican Party, of which Stevens was a leader, likewise understood the Fifth Amendment's commitment to natural rights as a
guaranty for speaking out against the spread of slavery. The 1860 Republican platform asserted that freedom was the normal state of
United States' territory.39 Despite the Republican Party's 1856 platform
that "all men are endowed with inalienable right[s]," it only committed40
itself to preventing the spread of slavery into the Western territories.
This stance fell short of the fuill implications of its political philosophy.
Only in the midst of the Civil War did the Republican Party adopt the
position that slavery must be eradicated throughout the nation.
Before ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, however,
proslavery forces manipulated the Fifth Amendment. Nineteenth cendo battle with the abolitionists during the period of strain and stress over just what the
Declaration meant with regard to society in nineteenth century America.").
35 See ALEXANDER TSESis, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: How HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY
FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 43-44 (2002) (discussing how ethnological rationalizations were used to support claims of black inferiority).
36CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
37Liberty Party Platform of 1844, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-1960, at

5 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald B.Johnson eds., 2d ed. 1961).
38See id.
39Republican Party Platform of 1860, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note
37, at 32.
40

Republican Party Platform of 1856, reprinted in NATIONAL

PARTY PLATFORMS,

37, at 27.
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tury apologists for the expansion of slavery developed a political philosophy that placed property at the pinnacle of personal interests and
regarded its protection as government's chief purpose. The Fifth
Amendment's Just Compensation Clause provided an artificial bastion
fortifying slavery against congressional action to limit its extension.
Based on this property rights centered ideology, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford found that the Missouri Compromise unconstitutionally violated substantive due process. 41 Chief Justice Roger
B. Taney wrote that
an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United
States of his liberty or property, merely because he came
himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of
the United States, and who had committed no offence
against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of
42
due process of law.

Taney firther equated slaves with chattel, holding that nothing in the
Constitution enabled Congress to give less protection to slave prop43
erty than to any other form of property.
It seems that Taney's decision was intended to undermine the
universal applicability of the Declaration of Independence and Congress's power to prevent the spread of slavery into the West. He did not
stand alone in his apparent wish to limit Congress's power to prevent
the spread of slavery, and he sided with the prejudices of other prominent government officials. For example, during debates on the KansasNebraska Bill, Senator Albert G. Brown declared, "negroes are not
men, within the meaning of the Declaration. If they were, Madison,
and Jefferson, and Washington, all of whom lived and died slaveholders, never could have made it, for they never regarded negroes as their
44
equals, in any respect."
The ability of both camps to harness the Fifth Amendment for
opposite ends signals the importance of constitutional interpretation
in the historic struggle over slavery. 45 Jacobus tenBroek, a historian of
the Reconstruction period, wrote that "[o]nce the constitutional starting point on either side was accepted, almost all else followed auto-

4160 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857).
42 Id.

43Id. at 452.
44CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 230 (1854).
45
JAcoBus TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER THE LAW 56 (Collier Books 1965) (1951).
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matically."46 If slaves were merely property, then the Fifth Amendment
protected owners' property rights. Proslavery rhetoric, which the Taney Court accepted, relied on the natural or vested property rights
view that the federal government could not trump state control over
private economic interests. 47 If slaves were humans, and the proslavery
argument a self-interested excuse for tyrannical exploitation, then the
Just Compensation Clause was inapplicable and the Due Process
48
Clause protected African American liberty. The antislavery position
relied on the Fifth Amendment to expound a natural rights theory
against exploitation of persons and the misappropriation of finda49
mental interests in life and liberty.
Ironically, the Framers' compromise on slavery which they had
made to secure the Union, was almost its undoing. A number of outspoken supporters of abolition were among the men who drafted the
Constitution in Philadelphia. Benjamin Franklin was well known for
his antislavery views and was elected. in 1787 as the president of the
Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery, the Relief of Negroes Unlawfully Held in Bondage.50 At the Constitutional
Convention the same year, George Mason and Gouverneur Morris
51
argued against continuing the slave trade. Some powerful Southerners sided with Thomas Jefferson who wanted compensated, grad52

ual manumission.

46 Id.
47 Proponents of the proslavery position used substantive due process analysis to claim
that slave owners had a natural right to possess human chattel. See Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth
Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM.J. LEGAL HIsT. 305, 318-19 (1988).
48

Id.

49 Id.
50 See OSCAR REiSS, BLACKS IN COLONIAL AMERICA 176 (1997) (quoting a speech Benjamin Franklin delivered as the president of the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the
Abolition of Slavery); Stephen P. Halbrook & David B. Kopel, Tench Coxe and the Right to
Keep and BearArms, 1787-1823, 7 Wst. & MARY BILL R-rs.J. 347, 357 (1999).
51 Paul Finkelman, Intentionalism, the Founders, and ConstitutionalInterpretation, 75 TEx.
L. REv. 435, 465-66 (1996) (reviewing JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996) (explaining Morris's and Mason's opposition to slavery during the Constitutional Convention's debate over Congress's
fiture power over commerce)).
52 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Jared Sparks (Feb. 4, 1824), in 12 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 334, 334-36 (Patti Leicester Ford ed., 1905); see 4 ALBERTJ. BEVERIDGE,
THE LIFE oFJoHN MARSHALL 473-79 (1919) (discussing Marshall's support for gradual, compensated emancipation and African colonization). James Madison believed in gradual
emancipation, compensated from national funds because the benefits of liberation would
be national. ALLAN NEVINS, ORDEAL OF THE UNION, SELECTED CHAPTERS 19 (1973).
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Economic interests, however, proved more powerful than ethical
ones. By the mid-eighteenth century, slavery was entrenched in both
the North and South. Northern shippers and merchants participated
in slave importation from the years preceding the Constitutional Convention until 1808, when the slave trade legally ended. 53 Northern
industrialists shipped Africans into the colonies and assured Southern
return on human capital by purchasing Southern goods. The North's
willingness to ship Africans provided the South with enough laborers
to turn a profit on what otherwise would have been fallow farmland.
The proslavery camp used its leverage at the 1787 Constitutional
Convention by demanding protections for slavery in exchange for ratifying the Constitution. The willingness to sacrifice human lives for the
sake of gaining the consent of South Carolinian and Georgian representatives led the country away from the universal values of the Declaration of Independence toward factional dogma, which often split on
the question of slavery.5 4 Those Northern and Upper Southern delegates who had sought an immediate cessation of the trade gave in to
the Deep South's demands.
To their credit, the Founders provided avenues for formal political change, including a method for proposing and amending the
Constitution with Article V, which Radical Republicans later used to
nullify the proslavery sections. However, the Founders did little to alter oligarchical social relations that existed in their own time. They
granted a disproportionate amount of power to slave owners, rather
than immediately producing the representative democracy that the
Declaration heralded. 55
The Framers' lack of concern for the human rights of slaves was
reflected in numerous constitutional clauses. The constitutional concessions to slavocracy were so extensive that the Thirteenth Amendment profoundly altered United States laws and societ. 56 The original
53 Paul Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little Gained, 13 YALE J.L. &
Human. 413, 418 (2001) (explaining how South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia
reopened the slave trade and imported tens of thousands of slaves after the Revolution
and prior to the Constitutional Convention); Wolff, supra note 9, at 1011 (discussing how
Northern merchants and shippers played a key role in the importation of slaves between
1778 and 1808).
54 HENRY H. SINms, A DECADE OF SECTIONAL CONTROVERSY, 1851-1861, at 33-34
(1942) (discussing Georgia's and South Carolina's objection to giving Congress power over
slave commerce).
55 FREEHLING, supra note 33, at 14, 16-18 (claiming that the American Revolutionists
intended a political but not a social revolution).
56 Historian Jack Rakove recently questioned whether the constitutional concessions to
South Carolina and Georgia were more extensive than was necessary to bring them into
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Constitution was marked by a glaring contradiction with'its protection
of both liberty and slavery. In an article first published in 1850, Frederick Douglass, who escaped from slavery in his youth and became a
renowned civil rights leader, brought out this contradiction:
If we adopt the preamble, with Liberty and Justice, we must
repudiate the enacting clauses, with Kidnapping and Slaveholding .... Every slaveholder in the land stands perjured in

the sight of Heaven, when he swears his purpose to be, the
establishment of justice-the providing for the general welfare, and the preservation of liberty to the people of this
that his whole life
country; for every such slaveholder knows
57
vow.
solemn
his
to
lie
gives an emphatic
Even though the Constitution did not use the terms "slave" or
"slavery;" it contained numerous protections for the South's peculiar
institution. Instead, the clauses that legalized slavery used euphemisms
to refer to bondsmen-"person held to Service or Labour," "such persons," and "other persons"7-which made constitutional passage less
contentious and alteration easier. Douglass, writing in his The North Star
newspaper, listed the Importation Clause among those constitutional
provisions that furthered slaveholding.58 The Importation Clause prohibited Congress from abolishing the international slave trade for
twenty years after state ratification of the Constitution.5 9 During that
period, the Importation Clause limited Congress's authority to levying a
ten-dollar head tax for each imported slave. Even though Congress
passed laws in 1818 and 1820 that severely punished participants of the
slave trade, calls for reopening the trade continued until the Civil War.
Supporters of the slave trade, particularly those from South Carolina
and Louisiana, sought to depress the prices of slaves by flooding the
60
market with them, thereby decreasing labor costs.

the Union, because those states had a significant interest in joining it. See RAKOVE, supra

note 51, at 58, 73-74, 93.
57Frederick Douglass, NORTm STAR, Apr. 5, 1850, reprinted in VOICES FROM THE GATHERING STORM: THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL VAR 40, 40-41 (Glenn M. Linden ed.,
2001) [hereinafter NORTH STAR]; see also Frederick Douglass, The Constitution and Slavery,
NORTH STAR, Mar. 16, 1849, reprinted in I THE LIFE AND WRITIrNGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 361 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950) [hereinafter DOUGLASS WRITINGS]; FREDERICK
DOUGLASS, The Revolution of 1848, Speech at West India Emancipation Celebration (Aug.
1, 1848), in DOUGLASS WRITINGS, supra, at 321.
58 NORTH STAR, supra note 57, at 40-41.

'9U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
60Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government's Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An
0iiginalistInquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 477, 556-57 (1998) (discussing provisions of the 1818
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Further, the Three-Fifths Clause 6' enabled the South to obtain a
"domineering representation" in the House of Representatives. 62 This
provided Southern congressmen with the power to proffer proslavery
laws and the numbers to pass them. Another author recently pointed
out that the Three-Fifths Clause also had a direct effect on presidential
elections. 63 Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 granted each state presidential electors whose number was equal to the state's combined number
of senators and representatives. 64 The electors, who comprise the body
that votes for the president, played a consequential role in placing
slaveholders into the executive office instead of principled antislavery
advocates, as occurred in 1800 when Thomas Jefferson defeated John
Adams for the presidency and in seating Northerners willing to placate
the slave South, as was the case with James Buchanan's victory in 1856.
Other constitutional provisions guarded slave owners against recalcitrant slaves and required federal involvement in maintaining the
peculiar institution. The Insurrection Clause gave Congress power to
call up the militia to suppress revolts, including slave rebellions such as
the Nat Turner Rebellion. 65 The Fugitive Slave Clause, which passed
without any dissenting votes at the Constitutional Convention, required
fugitives to be returned "on demand" and prohibited free states from

and 1820 statutes); see also P.L. Rainwater, Economic Benefits of Secession: Opinions in Mississippi in the 1850s, 1J. S. HIST. 459, 467 (1935) (discussing Jefferson Davis's desire to modify
the law of 1819 and repeal the 1820 piracy act because of the adverse affect on slave importation); Harvey Wish, The Revival of the African Slave Trade in the United States, 1856-1860,
27 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 569, 569, 572 (1941) (discussing how in the years immediately
preceding the Civil War powerful forces, particularly in Louisiana and South Carolina.
were on the verge of reopening the slave trade to gain more laborers).
61 The Three-Fifths Clause provided that slaves were to be counted as three-fifths of a
person for the purpose of determining how many representatives a state was to have in Congress. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
62 See Michael Kent Curtis, A Story for All Seasons: Akhil Reed Amar on the Bill of Rights, 8
WM. & MARY BILL Rts.J. 437, 453 (2000) (book review) (explaining that the Three-Fifths
Clause gave the South a disproportionate representation in the House of Representatives);
John Rockwell Snowden et al., Anerican Indian Sovereignty and Naturalization: It's a Race
Thing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 171, 195 (2001) (pointing out that Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment also excluded untaxed Indians from the numeration); cf Ruth Colker, The
Supreme Court's HistoricalErrors in City of Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REv. 783, 795 (2002)
(explaining that the Thirteenth Amendment's repeal of the Three-Fifths Clause and arguable grant of citizenship to slaves further increased the South's representation in Congress).
63 Paul Finkelman, The Color of Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 937, 971 (1993) (reviewing ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTTU'nON (1992)).

64 Cf. id. (explaining that the Constitution provided for the indirect election of the
president through an electoral college).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (giving Congress the power to "provide for calling forth
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions").
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liberating them. 66 Frederick Douglass denounced the provision for

for men," making
making "the whole land one vast hunting ground 67
slavery
of
fetters
the
broke
who
persons
of
felons out
This superabundance of slaveholding compromises made the Thirteenth Amendment critical, not only to ending the physical bondage of
slaves, but also to liberating the entire Constitution. The amendment
provision in Article V requires two-thirds of both congressional houses to
propose an amendment and three-fourths of state legislatures or conventions to ratify it. This made the passage of an antislavery amendment
wholly impossible in the United States before the Civil War, because, in
1860, slavery was legal in fifteen of the thirty-three states then in the
Union. 68 The Thirteenth Amendment rendered all clauses directly
dealing with slavery null and altered the meaning of other clauses that
originally had been designed to protect the institution of slavery, such
as the Insurrection Clause, to exclude their original design.
The Thirteenth Amendment further reinterpreted the Declaration of Independence to apply the universal declaration of human
rights to blacks, whites, and any other citizens. Until its ratification,
abolitionists like Charles Sumner, who argued that Fifth Amendment
6 Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (providing that "[n]o Person held to Service or Labour in one
State, tinder the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up
on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due"); see DoN E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW & POLITICS: THE DRED ScoTr CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
20-21 (1981) (disputing that the Fugitive Slave Clause was indispensable to the success of
the Constitutional Convention); Raymond T. Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's
Thesis on the Intent of a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 VAND. L. REV. 93, 121 (1989) (asserting
that the Fugitive Slave Clause did not arouse much debate at the Constitutional Convention because it was not a significant issue); Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 613 (1993) (asserting that although the "initial response" to
South Carolina's proposed fugitive slave provision "was hostile," the Constitutional Convention "with neither debate nor formal vote, adopted the ftigitive slave provision as a
separate article of the draft constitution"); see also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
539, 625-26 (1842) (overturning Edward Prigg's conviction under state law for kidnapping
a black mother and her children in order to return them to a Maryland owner).
67 Frederick Douglass, Farewuell Speech to the British People (Mar. 30, 1847), in DOUGLASS

WRITINGS, supra note 57, at 209.
6 In 1860, there were fifteen slave states and eighteen free states. Paul Finkelman, The
Centralityof the PeculiarInstitution in American Legal Development, 68 CH.-KENT L. REV. 1009,
1024 (1993); Robert R. Russel, The GeneralEffects of Slavery upon Southern Economic Progress, 4
J. S. HiST. 34, 40 (1938); see Samuel Marcosson, Colorizing the Constitution of Odginalism:
ClarenceThomas at the Rubicon, 16 L. & INEQ. 429, 469 (1998) (arguing that Article V can be
viewed as "the Framers' insurance policy against the possibility that then-excluded groups,
including women, slaves and free blacks, could one day change the power structure the
Founders had erected without regard to the needs, views, or priorities of the members of
those groups").
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guarantees applied to blacks and whites, held this view in the face of
explicit constitutional provisions to the contrary.69 Antebellum efforts
to restrict slavery were ingenious but limited in scope. In 1850, Congress used its Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 authority over the nation's
capital to prohibit slave trading, but not slavery, in Washington, D.C. ;70
legislators, however, could not do the same in the bordering states.
Antislavery advocates faced the dogma that states had the exclusive right to determine matters about slavery. The proslavery camp
typically grounded its assertion on the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers to the state or Article IV's guarantee of a republican
form of government. Senator John Calhoun, the leading nineteenthcentury states' rights advocate, refined this proslavery concept into
the doctrine of concurrent majorities. He argued that the national
government lacked the authority to regulate slavery because it was
unable to gain support from each state to do so. 71
The abolitionist movement responded to this proslavery ideology
with a natural rights perspective that was grounded in the Declaration of
Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution. Abolitionists aimed
to dismantle the Constitution's tolerance for slavery and their political
agenda gradually led to ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment.
II.

ABOLITION AND NATURAL RIGHTS

Before turning to judicial interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, I begin with a retrospective look at the Amendment's foundational aims. This background is necessary for my later dichotomization
between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and between the
Thirteenth Amendment and Cormnerce Clause.
Radical Republicans based the Thirteenth Amendment on the
natural rights principles that guided the abolitionist movement from
its founding in 1833.72 The movement was founded upon ideology
opposing both the proslavery and gradualist antislavery camps. Uni69 Se TENBROEK, supra note 45, at 56; MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL
WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 106-07 (2001).
70 Compromise of 1850, ch. 63, 9 Stat. 467.
71 MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FAILURE

54 (1998).

72 The American Anti-Slavery Society's 1833 Declaration of Sentiments, at http://www.

etsu.edu/cas/history/docs/antislaveryhtm (last visited Feb. 6, 2004), was an early exampie. Cf John P. Diggins, Slaveiy, Race, and Equality:Jefferson and the Pathos of Enlightenment,
28 AM. Q. 206, 222 (1976) (explaining that abolitionists found the natural rights theory
problematic because it did not separate human rights from property rights, and it lacked a
social responsibilities component).
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tarian leader William Ellery Channing explained, in 1835, that the
abolitionists' argument rested on the Declaration of Independence's

73
assertion of "the indestructible rights of every human being." Each

person was "born to be free," and the desire for wealth, especially in
human capital, could never trump individual rights.

74

Slavery was in-

right to inquire
imical because it stripped "man of the fundamental
75
into, consult, and seek his own happiness."
The oratory and research skill of Theodore D. Weld likewise promoted the movement's broad-ranging aspirations for national liberation. Through his influential book, American Slavery As It Is, Weld passed
on to Radical Republicans the view that slaveholders plundered slaves
of their "bodies and minds, their time and liberty and earnings, their
free speech and rights of conscience, their right to acquire knowledge,
and property and reputation." 76 The National Anti-Slavery Convention
relied on the "self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence
...and in the Golden Rule of the Gospel-nothing more, nothing
less. "77 The abolitionists in Congress echoed the same sentiments.
Senator Charles Sumner's arguments during the debates on the
Kansas-Nebraska Bill were representative of the ideas he also espoused
during the Senate debates on the Thirteenth Amendment. "Slavery,"
he stated in one speech, "is an infraction of the immutable law of nature, and, as such, cannot be considered a natural incident to any sovereignty especially in a country which has solemnly declared, in its
Declaration of Independence, the inalienable right of all men to life,
78
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
The Thirteenth Amendment's grant of power to Congress over
matters resembling the incidents of servitude signaled a break from
moderate antislavery leanings and a preference for radical abolitionist
principles. 79 Moderates wanted states gradually and separately to end
slavery With the outbreak of the Civil War, however, a radical form of

73WILLIAM E. CHANNING, SLAVERY 47-48 (Arno Press 1969) (3d ed. 1835).
74 Id. at 48.

75Id. at 51.
76 THEODORE D. WELD, AMERICAN SLAVERY As IT Is 7-8 (Arno Press 1968) (1839).
77The National Anti-Slavery Standard, February 21, 1857, quoted in William E. Nelson,

The Impact of the Antislaveiy Movement uipon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Cen tury
America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 536 (1974).
78
CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 268 (1854).
79 See DAVID Aj. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY,
AND LAW OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMIENDMENTS 97-99 (1993).
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abolitionism came to dominate Congress.8° Even Abraham Lincoln,
who also thought slavery was "a total violation" of the Declaration of
Independence, initially maintained a gradualist, state-by-state approach. His views changed only during the War when he realized that
Southern states would not be appeased into abandoning their expan81
sionist ambitions.
The Declaration takes for granted that the possession of natural
rights is "self-evident."82 Implicitly, this means people are intuitively
empathetic and can recognize that others are endowed with the same
rights. An advocate of the Thirteenth Amendment detailed a similar
view during the House debate on the proposed Amendment:
What vested rights so high or so sacred as a man's right to
himself, to his wife and children, to his liberty, and to the
fruits of his own industry? Did not our fathers declare that
those rights were inalienable? And if a man cannot himself alienate those rights, how can another man alienate them without being himself a robber of the vested rights of his brotherman? 83
Slavery was an anomaly in a country formed in opposition to British
violation of American civil liberties. Within this national context, the
Thirteenth Amendment brought the Constitution, which originally
protected the institution of slavery, into harmony with the Declaration

80 On the House side, Thaddeus Stevens was the leader of the Committee on the Ways
and Means during the debates on the Thirteenth Amendment, and, then, the Committee
on Appropriations during the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866. SeeJames A. Woodburn, The Attitude of Thaddeus Stevens Toward the Conduct of the Civil War, 12 Am. HIST. REV.
567, 567 (1907); Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, at http://bioguide.
congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000887 (last visited Feb. 6, 2004). Charles
Sumner was the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1861. Mark
M. Krug, The Republican Party and the Emancipation Proclamation, 48J. NEGRO HIsT. 98, 103
(1963). Henry Wilson was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Services and the
Militia. Id. Even more moderate leaders in the Republican Party, like Senator Lyman
Trumbull, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, rejected gradual abolitionism. See,
e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866) (arguing the Thirteenth Amendment
abolished slavery in all states and destroyed all incidents to slavery).
81Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Illinois, in Reply to Senator Douglas, in THE WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 209 (Arthur B. Lapsley ed., 1905) (1854).
82 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration recog-

nizes the existence of three natural rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. ALLEN
C. GUELZO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: REDEEMER PRESIDENT 224 (1999).

83 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1865) (quoting Representative John F. Farnsworth).
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of Independence. 84 Charles Black has pointed out that Thirteenth
Amendment principles were dormant in the Declaration of Independence. 85 Abolitionists changed legal culture to accord with ideals
that existed since 1776.
Radical congressmen used the amendment process under Article
V of the Constitution to alter the Constitution's initially inimical provisions. The Thirteenth Amendment provides an enforceable right for
the protection of those civil liberties that were valued in the Declaration of Independence but not implemented by the Constitution. The
Amendment allows Congress to secure liberty; life, and the pursuit of
happiness through positive laws. 86
Behind its enforceable provisions lies the national commitment
to secure personal liberties integral to civil welfare. Progressive advocates of the first reconstruction amendment made an earnest effort to
remove impediments standing in the way of civil rights. They regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as a means of restoring the natural rights long denied to both blacks and wage earners. According to
Radical Republicans, former slaves were not only freed from bondage;
they also had gained the right to make fundamental choices about
their jobs and families. Congressman M. Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania expressed the same point in general, rhetorical terms:
[W] hat kind of freedom is that which is given by the amendment of the Constitution, if it is confined simply to the exemption of the freedom from sale and barter? Do you give
freedom to a man when you allow him to be deprived of those
87
great natural rights to which every man is entitled by nature?
The Thirty-Ninth Congress opened in 1865 with a statement by
Schuyler Colfax, the incoming Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Given shortly after Congress passed the proposed Thirteenth Amendment and before the introduction of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, the statement was indicative of how Congress planned to use the
Thirteenth Amendment for Reconstruction. Colfax told the House:
84 W.R. BROCK, AN

AMERICAN

CRISIS: CONGRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION

1865-1867, at

266-69 (1963); Cf. STAUGHTON LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 185-213 (1967) (discussing the question of slavery and the Constitutional
Convention).
8 Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the ConstitutionalJustice of Livelihood, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1103 (1986).
8 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1864) (quoting Godlove S. Orth, who argued for a practical application of natural rights principles via the Thirteenth Amendment).
87 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152 (1866).
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[I] t is yours to mature and enact legislation which, ... shall
establish [state governments] anew on such a basis of enduring justice as will guarantee all necessary safeguards to the
people, and afford what our Magna Charta, the Declaration
of Independence, proclaims is the chief object of government-protection of all men in their inalienable rights.88
Radical Republicans relied on the Declaration of Independence
to elucidate the proposed amendment. Representative Godlove S.
Orth from Indiana expected the Amendment to "be a practical application of that self-evident truth," of the Declaration "'that [all men]
are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; that
among these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.'"

89

Its more

progressive advocates made an earnest effort to remove impediments
standing in the way of human rights. 90 Representative Francis W. Kellogg of Michigan traced the sources of the proposed amendment to
the Declaration and to the Preamble of the Constitution's requirement
that government promote the general welfare and secure liberty.9
Illinois Representative Ebon C. Ingersoll, who was elected to the
Thirty-Eighth Congress to fill the vacancy created by the death of legendary abolitionist Owen Lovejoy, voiced the desire to secure slaves
natural and inalienable rights because blacks have a right to "live in a
state of freedom."92 He asserted that they have a right to profit from
their labors and to enjoy conjugal happiness without fear of forced
separations at the behest of uncompassionate masters. 93 Moreover,
Ingersoll viewed the proposed amendment to apply to "the seven millions of poor white people who live in the slave States but who have
ever been deprived of the blessings of manhood by reason of... slavery. Slavery has kept them in ignorance, in poverty and in degradation." 94 Senator Henry Wilson likewise said the Thirteenth Amendment would provide "sacred rights" to whites and blacks. 95
Representative Thomas T. Davis of New York expounded on civil

liberty on January 7, 1865: "Liberty, that civil and religious liberty
which was so clearly beautifully defined in the Declaration of Inde88CONG. GLOBE,
89CONG. GLOBE,

CONG. GLOBE,
91Id. at 2954-55.
92 Id. at 2990.
93Id.
9

39th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1865).
38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1865).
38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1199 (1864).

94 Id.

95CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864).
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African slavery, was regarded as temporary in its char-

acter .... Our fathers predicted that the time would soon come when
the interests of the country would demand that slavery should pass
away."9 6 Representative John F. Farnsworth of Illinois thought the "old
fathers who made the Constitution ... believed that slavery was at war

"9 7
with the rights of human nature.
Republicans like Representative Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota
recognized that

slavery is not confined to any precise condition ....

Slavery

consists in a deprivation of natural rights. A man may be a
slave for a term of years as fully as though he were held for
life; he may be a slave when deprived of a portion of the
98
wages of his labor as fully as if deprived of all.

Senator John Sherman of Ohio regarded the Amendment's second
clause to be the grant of congressional power to actively secure freedpeople their liberty rights "to sue and be sued ... [and] to testify in a
court of justice." 99

The Thirty-Eighth Congress wanted the Thirteenth Amendment
to help achieve the liberty the), extolled during the debates of 1864
and 1865. The Amendment's second section made enforceable the
right to liberty. It placed the power to protect civil rights in the hands
of federal legislators, shifting the balance of power from the states. Yet
Supreme Court decisions that followed Reconstruction made the
Amendment virtually ineffectual, and it was only at the end of the
twentieth century that the Court corrected itself.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

The Framers of the Thirteenth Amendment were driven by the
conviction that slavery was an evil requiring permanent eradication.10 0
96

CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1864). Likewise, during the Senate debate,

Reverdy Johnson, who had represented one of Dred Scott's owners, argued that if the
Framers had known how much sectional strife would result from slavery, they would have

opposed it. The Anti-Slavery Amendment to the Constitution. Eloquent Speech of Reverdy Johnson.
He Takes Strong Groundfor Immediate Emancipation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1864, at 1.
97 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2978 (1864). Representative William D. Kelley of
Pennsylvania, however, thought the errors of the Founding Fathers for compromising with
wrongs were being expiated by blood, agony, and death. Id. at 2983.
9
8 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 588 (1866).
99 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1865).
100There have been a number of in-depth studies on the congressional debates. TENBROEK, supra note 45, at chs. 9 & 10; TsEsIs, supra note 11, at ch. 2; VORENBERG, supra note
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In the years following Reconstruction, the U.S. Supreme Court undermined the Radical ideals of universal freedom and, eventually, hmterpreted the Amendment so narrowly that its holdings came to resemble the reasoning of congressmen who had voted against the
Amendment. 10 1 In the years following the Compromise of 1877, the
Supreme Court stripped the Amendment of its countermajoritarian
potential. 0 2 Only during the 1960s' civil rights movement did the
Court recognize its mistake.
A. Judicial Overview
A Kentucky federal court's 1866 decision in United States v. Rhodes
was the first federal decision on the constitutionality of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, which Congress passed pursuant to its Thirteenth
Amendment enforcement authority'103 Congress passed the Civil Rights

69, at ch. 4; G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 12 Hous. L. REV. 1, 7-14 (1974); Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth
Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6-11 (1995).
101 Pamela Brandwein, Slavery As an Interpretive Issue in the Reconstruction Congress, 34
LAW & Soc'v REV. 315, 316, 354-55 (2000) (analyzing the Northern Democratic view, expressed during the 1864 and 1865 debates, for a limited reading of the Thirteenth
Amendment and linking it to later Supreme Court opinions).
102 President Rutherford B. Hayes entered the Compromise of 1877. It was an agreement between Democrats and Republicans giving Hayes, rather than SamuelJ. Tilden, the
presidential election of 1876, in exchange for Hayes's agreement to withdraw federal
troops from the South, thereby effectively ending what remained of Reconstruction. See
GEORGE H. HOEMANN, WHAT GOD HATH WROUGHTI' THE EMBODIMENT OF FREEDOM IN
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 160 (1987) (discussing the regressive effect of the Compromise on civil rights efforts). G. Sidney Buchanan, a legal historian, examined the effects of the Compromise of 1877 on judicial decisions, finding that they extended further
than the immediate congressional abandonment of Reconstruction legislation. Buchanan,
supra note 100, at 367. The Supreme Court. too, having sent the key member to the election committee, began determining opinions in line with the Compromise of 1877. See id.
at 367-68. Subsequent Court decisions became more averse to federal civil rights jurisdiction, until the Thirteenth Amendment was a hollow guarantee, remaining practically unenforceable. See id. at 367.
103 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866). Shortly after the States ratified the Thirteenth
Amendment, and before ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed four
statutes to enforce it. Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867); Act of February 5,
1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (expanding the scope of habeas corpus statutes); Civil Rights Act
of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866); Slave Kidnapping Act, ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50 (1866). These
laws were radical departures from antebellum legal thought and speak loudest against the
revisionist claim that the Thirteenth Amendment meant no more "for the Negro than
exemption from slavery." See JAMES Z. GEORGE, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN
THE UNITED STATES 114 (Negro University Press 1969) (1915) (claiming a limited scope
for the Thirteenth Amendment).
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10 4
The provisions of the Civil
Act over President AndrewJohnson's veto.
Reconstruction
Republican
Radical
the
of
Rights Act were indicative
January 12,
on
plans. Senator Lyman Trumbull reported the Bill,
1866.105 In its initial form, the Bill conferred citizenship on all persons,
except untaxed Indians, who inhabited the states or territories and
made it a crime to discriminate against their civil rights and innunities. 10 6 The initial Bill essentially guaranteed equal enjoyment of the
privileges and immunities of citizenship, but this language was removed
from the Bill's final draft. Nevertheless, in its enacted form the Act recognized the civil rights to

make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to
like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other,
any law, statute, ordinance,7 regulation, or custom, to the
0
contrary notwithstanding.
The Act granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases of any alleged violations. 0 8 Moreover, anyone who was denied the right to enforce his or her rights under the Act in a state court was permitted to
transfer the case to a federal court. State officials who violated the Act
under color of law or pursuant to custom were also subject to criminal

104 Johnson vetoed the measure despite the urging of leading moderate Republicans.
See Letter from Ohio Governor Jacob D. Cox to Andrew Johnson (Mar. 22, 1866), in 10
THE PAPERS OF ANDREW JOHNSON 287 (Paul H. Bergeron et at. eds., 1992). A note to the
same effect from Secretary of State William Seward is filed under the date of March 27,
1866 in ANDREW JOHNSON PAPERS Reel 21 and housed at the Library of Congress. Congress overrode Johnson's veto by a vote of 33 Senators for and 15 against, and the House
overrode his veto by a vote of 122 for and 41 against. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1809 (1866) (Senate vote); id. at 1861 (House vote). For Johnson's explanation of the
reasoning behind his veto, see 8 COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3603 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897). The Civil Rights Act's reach was national,
unlike the Freedman's Bureau Act, a Reconstruction statute and a temporary wartime
measure with no application outside the rebel states. See Freedman's Bureau Act ofJuly 16,
1866, ch. 200, § 14, 14 Stat. 176 (1866).
105CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211-12 (1866).
106 Id.
107 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
108 Id. § 3.
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prosecution. 0 9 Violators were subject to imprisonment for up to one
year and a fine of no more than $1000.110
Supreme Court Justice Noah Swayne, sitting as a designated circuit court justice in 1866, rendered the opinion in Rodes."' The case
arose after white defendants were charged with committing burglary
against Nancy Talbot, an African American."12 Justice Swayne found
that the Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress the power to pass
the Civil Rights Act and federal courts the power to hear civil rights
matters. 113 This was necessary to secure equal access to judicial redress
for newly freed blacks in both criminal and civil cases. 114 Justice
Swayne's decision was seeped with "the spirit in which the Amendment is to be interpreted."" 5 Without congressional enforcement
power, Justice Swayne wrote in dictum, "simple abolition ... would

have been a phantom of delusion."' 16
In 1872, while Justice Swayne was still an associate justice, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled very differently on a procedural matter in
Blyew v. United States.17just as Rhodes, Blyew was a federal removal case.
Kentucky law, in 1868, when the Blyew defendants were indicted, still
forbade black witnesses from testifying against white defendants." 8
Blyew was the first blow to the use of the Thirteenth Amendment for
ending centuries of racial intolerance. There was both oral and physical evidence at trial showing that on one nightJohn Blyew and George

109Id.

110

Id. §§ 5, 6.

111 27 F. Cas. 785.Justice Swayne heard this matter in federal court because Kentucky law

forbade blacks from testifying against whites in state courts. Id. at 785-86. He was an established abolitionist even before the Civil War, and at one time he freed slaves he and his wife
had received by marriage. JOSEPH FLETCHER BRENNAN, 1 THE (OHIo) BIOGRAPHICAL CYCLOPEDIA AND PORTRAIT GALLERY 101 (1880). As an attorney, Swayne had even represented
several fugitive slaves. William Gillette, Noah H. Swayne, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1978: THEIR LIVES & MAJOR OPINIONS 990 (Leon Friedman &
Fred L. Israel eds. 1980). His most famous representation came in the Oberlin rescue cases,

involving the Fugitive Slave Law. See genealy Bushnell v. Langston, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859); BushHell v. Langston, 8 Ohio St. 599 (1858).
112Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 785-86.
113Id. at 786-87.
114Id.
115See id. at 792.
116Id. at 794.
11780 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 590-95 (1872).
118Id. at 581 (citing 1860 Ky. Acts, § 1, ch. 104, vol. 2, at 470). The law only permitted

blacks and Native Americans to act as "competent witnesses" in civil suits to which the only
parties were blacks or Native Americans. Id.
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119
The
Kennard had murdered three generations of a black family.
Solicitor
States
United
The
black.
were
crime
to
the
only witnesses
General argued that the right to testify protected persons and property and was part and parcel of the freedom Congress assured all citizens regardless of race. 120 The Supreme Court, however, was convinced
by the defendants' procedural argument against federal court jurisdiction and reversed the convictions. 121 The Court held that only living
22
No
persons could request removal, making conviction impossible.
dead
were
victims
the
because
case
the
to
remove
one had standing
123
and the defendants had not affected any of the black witnesses.
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Joseph Bradley, criticized both the majority's narrow reading of the Civil Rights Act and 1its
24
disregard for the liberal ideals surrounding the statute's passage.
Bradley concluded that Congress broadly intended to prevent wanton,
25
racist conduct from being committed against the black community.1
The Amendment attempted to "do away with the incidents and consequences of slavery" and to replace them with civil liberty and equality.126 Justice Bradley further wrote that the chief aim of the Abolition
127
Amendment was to instate blacks to the full enjoyment of civil rights.
He also recognized that the majority opinion legitimized Kentucky's
practice of prohibiting blacks from testifying against whites and thereby
128
branded all blacks "with a badge of slavery."
Southern government officials and hoodlums alike used Blyew to
circumvent civil rights legislation. The case significantly diminished
the potential for a successful reconstruction. It branded blacks as easy
prey for individuals and groups who continued extolling the Confederacy and sought to reinvigorate its institutions. If the Ku Klux Klan
(the "KKK") and other violent supremacist groups had been at all
leery of being tried in federal courts, Blyew relieved them of that
worry. The federal government could no longer provide a judicial fo-

119 Murder: Particularsof the Late Tragedy in Lewis County, LOUISVILLE (Ky.) DAILY
Sept. 9, 1868, at 3.
120 Blyew, 80 U.S. at 589.
121Id. at 593-95.
122 See id.
123Id. at 581, 594.
124 See id. at 598-99 (BradleyJ., dissenting).

12.5See Blyew, 80 U.S. at 595-96 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
126 See id. at 601 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
127 See id. (Bradley,J., dissenting).
128 See id. at 599 (BradleyJ., dissenting).
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rum in cases where state laws prohibited blacks from testifying against
whites and the black victims of a crime were unavailable.
The period of substantive decline for Thirteenth Amendment
jurisprudence began in 1883 with the Civil Rights Cases.12 9 Bradle)y
who was by then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, drafted the majority opinion. He qualified his earlier dissent in Blyew and
significantly contributed to the reversal of Radical Reconstruction.
His ruling has implications for the contemporary distinction between
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 130
The constitutionality of the first two sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 was the subject of litigation in the Civil Rights Cases.' 31
The Act was the last legislation passed by the Reconstruction Congress.' 32 By the time the case came before the Supreme Court, Reconstruction had come to a grinding halt, even though many racialist institutions resembling slavery remained. These institutions included
adhesion contracts for sharecropping, segregation, peonage, and the
convict lease system.' 33

"9 See generally 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
130 Part V analyzes why this distinction makes the Thirteenth Amendment an important component for innovative civil rights activism. See infra notes 310-321 and accompanying text.
131The full name of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was "An act to protect all citizens in
their civil and legal rights." 18 Stat. 335.
132 See Colbert, supra note 100, at 22 (discussing debate over Reconstruction that arose
in passing Civil Rights Act of 1875); see also WILLIAM B. HESSELTINE, ULYSSES S. GRANT,
POLITICIAN 368-71 (1935) (discussing President Ulysses Grant's role in the controversy);
JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE ABOLITIONIST LEGACY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE
NAACP 16-19 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing Charles Sumner's heroic effort to secure passage
of the Act). Even on his death bed, Sumner did not forget that abolition, via the Thirteenth Amendment, meant more than merely setting free millions of people who were
denied an education by Southern slave codes and were still excluded from numerous public places. As he lay on his death bed, Sumner was not remiss to remind a visitor: "You must
take care of the civil-rights bill, . .. don't let it fail." ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF

RECONSTRUCTION 226 (1990). Sumner died in March 1874 and did not live to see the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Id. Benjamin Butler, who managed the Bill in the
House, committed himself to defending "the rights of these men who have given their
blood for me and my country." Id.
133 One author recently found that in Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia, as many as
one-third of all sharecropping farmers "were being held against their will in 1900." See
JACQUELINEJONES, THE DISPOSSESSED 107 (1992). Other authors have focused specifically
on the convict lease system. See generally ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WrORK OF FREE
LABOR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH

M. OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN SLAVERY (1996);

(1996);

DAVID

KARIN A. SHAPIRO, A NEW SOUTH REBELLION:

THE BATTLE AGAINST CONVICT LABOR IN THE TENNESSEE COAL FIELDS, 1871-1896 (1998).
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The Civil Rights Cases involved five joint cases from various parts
of the country.13 4 The first four cases were reviews of criminal prosecutions. 135 Two of the defendants were charged for denying blacks
access to an inn or hotel, a third for prohibiting a black individual
from access to the dress circle of a theater in San Francisco, and a
136
fourth for refusing access to a New York opera house. The fifth case
was a civil action from Tennessee against a railroad company whose
13 7
conductor prevented a black woman from riding in the ladies' car.
Attorneys for four of the five defendants did not even bother appearing to argue the cases before the Court.13 8 The favorable ruling the
defendants received was a clear signal for the national consensus to
draw away from abolitionist principles.
The limits on Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers announced in the Civil Rights Cases continue to be binding, and the

Rehnquist Court recently further extended Chief Justice Bradley's
ruling.13 9 The Civil Rights Cases held that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects citizens against state interference with individual rights, but

140 Thus, Bradley
not against individual invasion of individual rights.
decided that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress
authority to prevent social discrimination, such as exclusion from
public places of amusement and segregation on public carriers. The
Court, therefore, found that the first two sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amend141
ment.
Justice John Marshall Harlan, the lone dissenter in the Civil
Rights Cases, argued that congressional enforcement power, under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, was more realistic and analogous to Radical Republican ideals of Reconstruction. The fifth section
of the Amendment, Justice Harlan wrote, enabled Congress to enact
134

109 U.S. at 4-5.

135

Id.

36

1

Id.

137 Id.
138 LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS:

UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO

THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

137-38 (1966).

139See infratext accompanying notes 313-316.
140 109 U.S. at 11, 19 ("It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. It has a
This is not corrective legislation; it is primary and direct; it
deeper and broader scope ....
takes immediate and absolute possession of the subject of the right of admission to inns,
public conveyances, and places of amusement. It supersedes and displaces State legislation
on the same subject, or only allows it permissive force.").
141

Id. at 24-25.
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"appropriate legislation ... and such legislation may be of a direct and
primary character, operating upon states, their officers and agents, and
also upon, at least, such individuals and corporations as exercise public
functions and wield power and authority under the state." 142
I critique the Fourteenth Amendment's state interference requirement in relationship to the Thirteenth Amendment in Part V.143
Suffice it to say here that, in the unreconstructed South, the idea that
states would regulate private discriminations was farfetched. Chief Justice Bradley made an artificial dichotomy, although one that was common in post-Reconstruction United States, between civil rights and social rights. In the Civil Rights Cases, he held that the Fourteenth
Amendment covered civil rights, which included making contracts and
leasing land, but not social rights, which pertained to using public accommodations. 144 Thus, as Angela P. Harris pointed out in a recent article, the Court limited Congress's ability to protect citizens pursuant to
its federalist vision.1 45 The Court continues to follow the Civil Rights
Cases ruling on the state action requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 46 The ruling has so crippled the legislative branch's enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment that Congress was
forced to rely on the Commerce Clause to pass major civil rights legislation, like the 1964 Civil Rights Act, in the twentieth century 47
The Court in the Civil Rights Cases also considered whether the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 was constitutional under the Thirteenth
Amendment. Indeed, the Civil Rights Cases provided the Supreme
Court with its first opportunity to directly interpret the Thirteenth
Amendment's substance. The Court recognized that the Amendment
went further than simply releasing slaves from their masters' control. 148 In fact, Chief Justice Bradley reiterated his conviction that the

142Id. at 36 (HarlanJ., dissenting).
143 See infra notes 310-321 and accompanying text.
144 SeeJames W. Fox, Jr., Re-Readings and Misreadings:Slaughter-House, Privileges or Int-

munities, and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 Ky. L.J. 67, 160-61 (2002-2003) (explaining
the distinction made during the mid-nineteenth century between social, civil, and political
rights).
145 Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race
Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1923, 1961 (2000).
146 See Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better Angels, and UnprincipledNeutrality
Claims, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1285, 1333-34 (2003) (stating that the current Court continues to follow the Civil Rights Cases holding on the restraints of Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power).
147 See generally Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
148 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
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Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress the power to pass all laws
"necessary and proper for the obliteration and prevention of slavery,
with all its badges and incidents." 149 He even conceded that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited state and private violations. 150
Nevertheless, the Court held that denying admission to public
accommodations was not a vestige of slavery'. 5' The Court reasoned
that "the social rights of men and races in the community" differ from
52
"findamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship.'
Just as with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court determined that
the Thirteenth Amendment only applies to civil and political rights.
The Civil Rights Cases limited the term "necessary incidents" of slavery
to a set of legal institutions, such as prohibitions against blacks testifying in court and owning property. 153 Thus, the Court determined that
Congress overreached when it sought to extend legislative authority
154
against social discriminations.
Chief Justice Bradley's conclusion was in no way obvious. He stuck
to an artificial dichotomy rather than recognizing that social discriminations perpetrated in public detrimentally affect both the victim and
his or her group. In these cases, social discriminations limited the
plaintiffs' ability to travel by rail, attend an opera, reserve a room at an
inn, or see a play with friends. Such infringements on the plaintiffs'
basic rights branded them unworthy of the same privilege to make personal choices enjoyed by whites and perpetuated the supremacist mentality of Southern slavocracy. The Court's holding showed callousness
to the way public accommodation discrimination hindered blacks from
enjoying their freedom. Chief Justice Bradley's dismissive opinion in
149Id.

at 20-21.

150 See id. at 20.
151Id. at 25.

id. at 22. Bradley went on to say that the Thirteenth Amendment "simply abolished slavery" whereas the Fourteenth Amendment "prohibited the states from abridging
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." See id. at 23. His conclusions
deviate from his dissent to Blyew, in which he recognized Congress's power to pass the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 indicate that congressmen
regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as a conduit for equal rights legislation. See supra
notes 124-128 and accompanying text; see also George A. Schell, Note, Open Housing:Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. & Title VIII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 AM. U. L. REv. 553, 556
(1969) (discussing the Court's differentiation between social and civil rights).
153 See 109 U.S. at 22.
154 See id. at 24-25. Bradley put this point in the form of a reductio ad absurdum: "It
would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of
discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as
to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or
deal with in other matters of intercourse or business." Id.
152 See
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the Civil Rights Cases furthered the social tensions and misery that the
Radical Republicans hoped to eliminate with the Thirteenth Amendment. Homegrown militias, such as the KKK, and private business
owners who refused to provide blacks with goods and services were
now protected by state indifference or outright support for discriminatory practices. 155
Justice Harlan, in his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, understood
that the majority's decision precluded the national government from
ending state-sponsored or -countenanced abridgements of freedons.156 He found the majority's opinion to be "narrow and artificial"
and inimical to the "substance and spirit" of the Thirteenth Amendment. 157 Harlan understood that because the dogma of black inferiority was integral to maintaining slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment's
guarantee of "freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and protection against, all discrimination against them, because of their race,
in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other races." 15 8
ForJustice Harlan, this principle carried a practical implication:
Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce that
amendment, by appropriate legislation, may enact laws to
protect that people against the deprivation, on account of their
race, of any civil rights enjoyed by other freemen in the same
state; and such legislation may be of a direct and primary
character, operating upon states, their officers and agents,
and also upon, at least, such individuals and corporations as
exercise public functions and wield power and authority un1 59
der the state.
Although Justice Harlan agreed with Chief Justice Bradley that
Congress lacked the power to regulate social interaction, he proclaimed that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in fact did protect civil
155 See id. Bradley explicitly argued that equal access to public amenities is unconnected to the enjoyment of fundamental rights: "There were thousands of free colored
people in this country before the abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of
life, liberty, and property the same as white citizens; yet no one, at that time, thought that
it was any invasion of their personal status as freemen because he was not admitted to all
the privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because they were subjected to discriminations
in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public conveyances and places of amusement." Id. at 25.
56
1 See id. at 54 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).

157Id.

at 26 (Harlan,J., dissenting).

CivilRights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36 (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
159 Id. (HarlanJ., dissenting).
158
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rights. 60 He argued that state laws and private practices denying blacks
the use of public accommodations excluded them from participation in
an essential aspect of civic life. 16 1
After the Civil Rig/its Cases, the Thirteenth Amendment was relegated to virtual disuse. The Court continued to chip away at federalism and Congress's ability to prevent private or state discrimination.
The Court maintained the distinction between social and civil rights
in Plessy v. Ferguson, where the Court did not regard the facilitation of
62
In concluding that
social equality to be part of judicial function.
separate accommodations on railcars did not violate the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Court quoted the Civil Rig/its Cases for the proposition that the end of slavery did not require anyone to deal with other
races in matters of intercourse or business. 163 Justice Henry Brown,
writing for the Plessy majority, took a literalist approach to slavery, atthe two races
tacking the assumption that the enforced separation of
164
inferiority.
of
badge
a
stamped African Americans with
Just as he had in the Civil Rig/its Cases, Justice Harlan wrote the
dissenting opinion in Plessy. He regarded the right of persons to share
165
Harlan was
railroad cars as inherent in the concept of freedom.
prescient in foreseeing that the separate but equal doctrine would not
be limited to rail travel, but would continue to infect many other aspects of civil society.166
160Id.

at 59 (Harlan,J., dissenting).

at 55-56 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
161See id.
See 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (stating that "[i]f the two races are to meet upon
terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of
each other's merits and a voluntary consent of individuals. . . . If the civil and political
rights of both races be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one
race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put
them upon the same plane").
163 Id. at 543 ("It would be running the slavery argument into the ground,' said Mr.
Justice Bradley, 'to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit
to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will ... deal with in other
matters of intercourse or business.'" (quoting CivilRights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-25)).
164 Id. at 551. Only in 1954 did the Supreme Court find the "separate but equal" doctrine unconstitutional. Brom v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
16 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). On the importance of Harlan's dissent in Plessy to principled legal discourse, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE TE PEOPLE: FoUNDATIONS 146 (1991) and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Casefor Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUNi.
162

L. REV. 1060, 1076 (1991).
'66Justice Harlan reflected on the extensive implications of the majority's holding: "If
a state can prescribe, as a rule of civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not travel as
passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not so regulate the use of the streets of
its cities and towns as to compel white citizens to keep on one side of a street, and black
citizens to keep on the other?" Pessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
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The escape from the morass into which the Court had helped
drag this country came in 1968, in Jones v. A'fred H. Mayer Co. 167 That
case overruled the Civil Rights Cases limited construction of the Thirteenth Amendment's second section.1 68 The Jones Court ruled that
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as a "necessary and
proper" means of prohibiting private and public discrimination in
real estate transactions.1 69 However, Justice Potter Stewart, writing for
the Court, expressly avoided reaching the issue of whether the Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress authority to prevent discrimination in places of public accommodation, concluding that the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 had made that issue moot. 170 Nevertheless, Jones
gave Congress wide latitude to pass legislation against civil rights violations. The majority wrote that "[s]urely Congress has the power under
the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the
badges and the incidents of slavery and the authority to translate that
determination into effective legislation."171
A logical extension of Jones is that Congress has the power to legislate against state or private infringements that arbitrarily interfere
with individuals' right to live freely. Although Congress's deterinination of arbitrariness is subject to a rationality requirement, the standard is a low one that the federal legislature can meet by examining
167 392 U.S. 409, 438-44 (1968) (upholding Congress's power to prevent private housing discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1982).
168Id.
169Id. (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20). The Enabling Clause "clothed 'Congress with power to pass all lawVs necessary and properfor abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery in the United States.'" Id. The Court read § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (2002)) to prohibit private actors from discriminating against real property purchasers: "[T]he fact that § 1982 operates upon the unofficial acts of private individuals,
whether or not sanctioned by state law, presents no constitutional problem. If Congress has
power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eradicate conditions that prevent Negroes
from buying and renting property because of their race or color, then no federal statute
calculated to achieve that objective can be thought to exceed the constitutional power of
Congress simply because it reaches beyond state action to regulate the conduct of private
individuals." Id. at 438-39. For a survey of civil rights cases arising under nineteenth century statutes, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Civil Rights Act of 1968 see Note, Federal
Power to Regulate PrivateDiscrimination:The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 449, 466-505 (1974).
170Jones, 392 U.S. at 440-41, 441 n.78 ("[t]he Court did conclude in the
Civil Rights
Cases that 'the act of... the owner of the inn, the public conveyance or place of amusement, refusing ... accommodation' cannot be 'justly regarded as imposing any badge of
slavery or servitude upon the applicant' .... [w] hatever the present validity of the position
taken by the majority on that issue-a question rendered largely academic by Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964" (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24)).
171Id.

at 440.
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the historical landmarks of slavery, evaluating what existing practices
perpetuate the incidents of involuntary servitude, and promulgating
laws to end them. Congress, then, has the power to end any existing
coercive and arbitrary injustices analogous to involuntary servitude.
Jones also recognized that the United States is responsible for protecting its citizens against arbitrary infringement of fundamental
rights. 172 National civil rights laws, therefore, can confront civil rights
violations directly and need not operate behind a veil of congressional
power over interstate conunerce. 173 Moreover, Jones required courts to
analyze human rights violations in a way significantly different from the
state action analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the decision raised intriguing questions about whether, even without congressional action, persons can bring suit both against states and individuals
for violating the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment.1 74 This is
because, whereas the second section authorizes Congress to pass federal laws rationally tailored to end the badges and incidents of servitude, the first section is a self-executing, judicially enforceable prohibition against any remaining incidents of involuntary servitude, and that
institution's injustices far exceeded forced labor.
In the Supreme Court cases that followed Jones, the Court continued holding that Congress could prohibit private racial discrimination pursuant to its Section 2 Thirteenth Amendment power. In Runyon v. Mc'rary the Court addressed the narrow issue of whether
§ 1981 prohibited private schools from refusing to enroll students
based on their race. 175 Its holding had broad social ramifications on
the integration of private schools. The relevant part of the statute
provided that, "[aill persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State ...to make and enforce
contracts ...as is enjoyed by white citizens."176 Justice Stewart based

172Id. at 440-41.
173See infra text accompanying notes 274-281.

Se Jones, 392 U.S. at 439 ("'By its own unaided force and effect,' the Thirteenth
Amendment 'abolished slavery, and established universal freedom.'" (quoting Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 20)). In a later case, the Court noted the outstanding issue of "whether
§ 1 of the Amendment by its own terms did anything more than abolish slavery." City of
Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125-26 (1981). This means that "the Court neither
agreed nor disagreed with the first Justice Harlan's statement in dissent in Hodges that 'by
its own force, that Amendment destroyed slavery and all its incidents and badges, and
established freedom.'" Id. at 126 n.40 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hodges v. United
States, 203 U.S. 1, 27 (1906), overruled by Jones, 392 U.S. 409).
175427 U.S. 160, 163 (1976).
176 Id. at 160 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a)).
174
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his decision on § 1981's prohibition against contract discrimination. 77
The school violated the law because it refused to enter into a contract
with the parents of potential students who happened to be black. 78
The Court found that the free association and privacy rights of parents wanting to keep the school segregated did not trump the rights
of parents wanting to enroll their children. 179 Parental desire to send
their children to a private, segregated school also did not override the
government's reasonable prohibition against the school's discriminatory contracting practices. 180
The Court could have sent an even stronger message about the
nation's commitment to freedom had it used a more historical, rather
than contractual, analysis. The Court's holding could have been based
on the right to parental autonomy which had been denied both
through Slave Codes and by individual slave masters. 181 Schools that
refuse to admit students because of their race violate the parents'

177Id.

at 168-73.

Id. at 172-73 ("It is apparent that the racial exclusion practiced by the FairfaxBrewster School and Bobbe's Private School amounts to a classic violation of § 1981. The
parents ... sought to enter into contractual relationships . .. for educational services....
Under those contractual relationships, the schools would have received payments for services rendered, and the prospective students would have received instruction in return for
those payments.... But neither school offered services on equal basis to white and nonwhite students."). Justice Byron White, writing for the dissent, argued that § 1981 could
not be used to force people to enter into contracts, no matter what their motives were for
refusing to do so. Id. at 194-95 (White,J., dissenting).
179Id. at 175-77.
180 Runyon, 427 U.S. at 175-77.
181 Mary Beth Norton et al., The Afro-American Family in the Age of Revolution, in SLAVERY
AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 186-87 (Ira Berlin & Ronald
Hoffman eds., 1983) (explaining that slavery compromised family integrity because masters could sell their slaves for economic, subdting, or whimsical reasons); see HERBERT G.
178

GUTMAN, BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY

& FREEDOM, 1750-1925, at 207-11 (1976) (conclud-

ing that despite the risk of being forcefully separated by sale, slaves were able to develop
cohesive family structures); Peter Kolchin, Reevaluating the Antebellum Slave Community: A
ComparativePerspective, 71 J. Am. HIST. 579, 584 (1983) (discussing the difficulties faced by
slaves who married the slaves of other owners). For more regional information about the
slave family that developed since the 1980s, see generally LARRY E. HUDSON, JR., To HAVE
AND TO HOLD: SLAVE WORK & FAMILY LIFE IN ANTEBELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA (1997); ANN
PATTON MALONE, SWEET CHARIOT. SLAVE FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE IN NINE-

TEENTH-CENTURY LOUISIANA (1992). After 1865, in an effort to retain slavery through
legal ruse, several states instituted child apprenticeship laws. These statutes required children to serve for a term of indenture away from parents, so long as a white judge determined that such service was in the children's best interests. PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN
SLAVERY, 1619-1877, at 220-21 (1993). These child apprenticeships, as Leon Litwack
pointed out, amounted to legalized kidnapping and de facto slavery. LEON F. LITwACK,
BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 191, 237-38 (1979).
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Thirteenth Amendment right to make rational decisions about where
to educate their children, not merely the parents' contractual right.
The Court's 1973 decision in Tilinan v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation
82
Ass'n provided even stronger ammunition in the civil rights arsenal.
The litigation involved a private swimming club that discriminated
against blacks in its membership and guest policies. 183 Three African
Americans, to whom the Association denied access, sought damages
and an injunction against the practice pursuant to the racist leasing
and rental practice prohibitions under §§ 1981 and 1982.184 Justice
Harry Blackmun, for the majority, reasoned that because the Association's membership was tied to a narrow geographic location, persons
who lived and purchased property valtated their real estate partly on
1 5
the expectation that they could join the recreation center. The decision was thus again rooted in contract law rather than in a fundamental right to enjoy public accommodations. The Court limited itself to
examining the discrimination on the basis of the existing statutes instead of the Thirteenth Amendment's underlying principles.
In a 1975 case, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., the Court
further extended the applicability of § 1981, finding that it allowed
86
recovery for the discriminatory conduct of a private employer. The
case provides a rich distinction between employment discrimination
claims under § 1981 and Title VII, the latter being the traditional avenue for relief in employment discrimination cases.18 7 The Court's
holding makes clear why plaintiffs often fair better in employment
discrimination claims filed under § 1981 instead of Title VII. For instance, Title VII's relatively short statute of limitations is not applicable to § 1981 claims. 88 Instead, § 1981 claims, ;! la Johnson, apply the
pertinent personal injury statute of limitations from the plaintiffs state.

18 See410 U.S. 431, 435-40 (1973).
183 Id. at 432-33.

at 433-34. The Court found no need to examine whether §§ 1981 and 1982 applied to private discrimination, determining that it was sufficient that the "operative language" of both was "traceable" to section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 439-40.
188Id. at 437.
186 421 U.S. 454, 459-61 (1975).
187 See id. at 457-67.
188 Title VII ordinarily requires an aggrieved party to file a charge with the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within 180 days of the alleged unlawful
employment practice, or 300 days after the unlawful practice if the aggrieved party files a
discrimination complaint in a state or local agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2003). Filing a
Title VII action with the EEOC does not toll the statute of limitations on § 1981 claims.
Johnson, 421 U.S. at 465-66.
184Id.
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In Johnson, the Court applied Tennessee's one-year limitation period, 8 9
which was significantly longer than Title VII's 180-day requirement to
file the employment claim with the EEOC or 300 days to file with a state
office. Other courts commonly apply two- or three-year state personal
injury statutes of limitations to § 1981 cases. 190 Further advantages to
the Thirteenth Amendment-based employment discrimination claims
are that § 1981 does not exempt employers who are improper parties
under Title VII and § 1981 does not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.' 9 1 Johnson offers a meaningful alternative to persons
seeking creative litigation strategies to obtain equitable and pecuniary
relief for employment discrimination. 192
In a 1989 case, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Supreme Court
ruled that § 1981 applies to racial discrimination perpetrated during
the contract formation process, but not to post-formation discrimination.1 93 Congress superceded the Court's ruling by passing the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (b).194 The section pro-

vides that "the term 'make and enforce contracts' includes the making,
189 421 U.S. at 462.
190See, e.g., Rogers v. Barkin, No. 00-16025, 2001 WL 1218413, at *1 (9th Cir. May 31,
2001) (deciding that Nevada's two-year personal injury statute of limitations applied to
§ 1981 claims); Alexanderi'. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1346 (11 th Cir. 2000) (applying
a two-year personal injury statute of limitations to both § 1981 and § 1983 claims); Thomas
v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1514 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that damages awarded
for a § 1981 claim were limited by the state's two-year personal injury statute). Some courts
have also applied three-year personal injury statutes of limitations. See, e.g., King v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352, 356 (2d Cir. 2002); Carney v Am. Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1096
(D.C. Cir. 1998). The Eleventh Circuit even found that a four-year statute of limitations
applied to a § 1981 claim. Baker v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 850 F.2d 1480, 1481 (11th
Cir. 1988).
191
Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460-61 (asserting that "[s]ection 1981 is not coextensive in its
coverage with Title VII. The latter is made inapplicable to certain employers. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b)"). The Supreme Court stated this matter more positively in a footnote to a
1994 case. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 304 n.3 (1994) ("Even in the
employment context, § 1981's coverage is broader than Title VII's, for Tide VII applies
only to employers with 15 or more employees, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), whereas § 1981
has no such limitation."). Likewise, in a concurring and dissenting opinion to Patterson v.
McLean Credit UnionJustice William Brennan wrote that "§ 1981 is not limited in scope to
employment discrimination by businesses with 15 or more employees, cf. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b), and hence may reach the nearly 15% of the workforce not covered by Title
VII." 491 U.S. 164, 211 (1989) (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But
then, Title VII also has advantages: it provides certain remedies, such as the recovery of attorneys' fees, which § 1981 does not.Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460.
i9.Plaintiffs may sue to recover damages under both Tide VII and § 1981.Johnson, 421
U.S. at 459.
193491 U.S. at 171.
19 Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (b) (2003)).
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performance, modification and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." 195 Furthermore, the amended version of § 1981 ex96
plicitly covers private and state violators.1
The cases decided since the 1968 landmark decision in Jones show
just how broadly the Thirteenth Amendment reaches, even when litigants rely on civil rights statutes like §§ 1981 and 1982.197 Congress
can go much farther and pass new statutes pursuant to its Section 2
authority, particularly in light of the sensibility against discrimination
that has burgeoned in the United States since the 1960s. Certainly
discrimination in real estate transactions and private schools is not
literally slavery or involuntary servitude. The Court, however, interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment as granting Congress discretionary power to determine what forms of discrimination are rationally
related to the incidents and badges of servitude. The Court's analyses
in Jones, Runyon, and Johnson indicate that Congress can pass effective
laws rationally designed to end any remaining incidents and badges of
servitude. I return to the subject of how to differentiate which liberties the Thirteenth Amendment covers below, where I show how the
1 98
Amendment fits into traditional civil rights law.
B. Section One Authority
The Supreme Court has never determined whether a private
party can bring a cause of action under the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court's current stance on this issue is somewhat ambiguous. Generally lower court decisions proscribe independent judicial use of Section 1 to determine which discriminations
are rationally related to the incidents and badges of servitude. 199
1 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (b) (2003).
196 Id. ( 'he rights protectdd by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment tinder color of State law.").
197Both statutes are modeled after the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
198 See infra Part V.B.
199 Other courts have required plaintiffs to confine themselves to statutes passed pursuant to Congress's Section 2 power. See, e.g., Crenshaw v. City of Definiak Springs, 891 F.
Supp. 1548, 1556-57 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (noting, however, that "neither the Supreme Court
of the United States or the Courts of Appeal have decided the extent to which a direct
cause of action exists under the Thirteenth Amendment"). On this point, the Fifth Circuit
noted in 1997 that, "[w]hile it is true that suits attacking the 'badges and incidents of slavery' must be based on a statute enacted under § 2, suits attacking compulsory labor arise
directly under prohibition of § 1, which is 'undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation.'" Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 217 n.5 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20). Likewise, the Fourth Circuit stated that "[wihile Congress may
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There is, however, a faint glimmer of hope in Supreme Court dicta
that suggests a more progressive position.
Palmer v. Thompson, decided in 1971, addressed the Section 1 issue but left it unresolved. 200 In 1962, Jackson, Mississippi closed four
segregated swimming pools and surrendered the lease of a fifth segregated pool. 20 Whites had exclusively used four pools and only
blacks used the fifth. 202 The city council claimed that its decision was

based on findings that continuing to operate the pools would be too
costly and that closing them was necessary for preserving public order.20 3 The petitioners sought an injunction to reopen the pools on a
desegregated basis. They claimed that Jackson closed the facilities "because of ideological opposition to racial integration in swimming pools"
and that the city thereby violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Anendments. 20 4 Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, refused to
second-guess the legislators' motives. 205 The Court determined that the
arguably have some discretion in determining what kind of protective legislation to enact
pursuant to the thirteenth amendment, it appears that the amendment's independent
scope is limited to the eradication of the incidents or badges of slavery and does not reach
other acts of discrimination." Washington v. Finlay 664 F.2d 913, 927 (4th Cir. 1981).
The general trend among lower courts has been to reject an independent cause of action tinder the Thirteenth Amendment. This is particularly true with employment discrimination claims. See, e.g., Rash x Minority Intermodal Specialists, Inc., 2001 WL 1654710, at *5
(N.D. IIl. Dec. 20, 2001) (stating that "[pilaintiff cannot bring a private right of action directly under the Thirteenth Amendment for employment discrimination"); Horton v. Norfolk S. Corp., 102 F. Sipp. 2d 330, 335 (M.D.N.C. 1999) (stating the Thirteenth Amendment
does not provide "an independent action for employment discrimination"); Mitchell v. Carrier Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1568, 1575 (M.D. Ga. 1995) (finding that the Thirteenth Amendment does not provide an independent cause of action in employment cases); Baker v.
McDonald's Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1474, 1480 n.12 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (stating that, although unequal treatment of black persons may violate the Thirteenth Amendment, "plaintiff may not
maintain a cause of action directly under the Thirteenth Amendment for employment discrimination. Rather, the plaintiff must base his claims on one of the implementing statutes,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) or§ 1981").
These outcomes are not the Thirteenth Amendment's necessary effect. Section 1 of
the Amendment could allow courts to be just as expansive in determining that a particular
discrimination is rationally related to the incidents and badges of servitude as Congress's
broad power to do so under Section 2. For a discussion of why lower court decisions limiting the use of Section 1 diverge from Supreme Court precedents, see Larry J. Pittman,
Physician Assisted Suicide in the Dark Ward: The Intersection of the Thirteenth Amendment and
Health Care Treatments Having DisproportionateImpacts on Disfavored CGroups, 28 SETON HALL
L. REV. 774, 851-71 (1998).
200 Seegenerally 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
201 Id. at 218-19.
.02Id.
203 Id. at 225.
204 Id. at 224-25.
205 Palmer,403 U.S. at 224-25.
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review and
stated legislative purposes were beyond the scope of judicial
20 6
affirmed the district court's denial of injunctive relief.

The petitioners had argued that "the city's closing of the pools to
keep the two races from swimming together violates the Thirteenth
Amendment." 207 Justice Black determined that, absent a federal law requiring the Court to open swinming pools, the Court could not "legislate new laws to control the operation of swimming pools throughout the
08
length and breadth of this Nation." 2 The Court implicitly recognized
Congress's second section authority to pass a law prohibiting govern20 9
mental entities from purposefilly refusing to desegregate. The Court,
however, refused to use any "authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to declare new laws to govern the thousands of towns and cities of
the country" because that "would grant it a law-making power far beyond
210
the imagination of the amendment's authors." Instead, the Court declared that, "[t]he last sentence of the Amendment reads: 'Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.' But
Congress has passed no law under this power to regulate a city's opening or closing of swimming pools or other recreational facilities."211
Even though the Court decided not to require that the city reopen
the pools, the dictum in Palnerwas the closest the Court has come to
recognizing that it might sua sponte use Section 1 authority to find a
discriminatory law unconstitutional. The Court stated that "[sihould
citizens of Jackson or any other city be able to establish in court that
public, tax-supported swinuning pools are being denied to one group
at 225-27. After accepting the lower court's finding that the city council closed
legitimate safety and economic reasons, the Court explained why it refused to
for
the pools
second-guess the proffered motives:
206 Id.

[T]here is an element of fitility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters. If the law is struck down for this
reason, rather than because of its facial content or effect, it would presumably
be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for
different reasons.
Id. at 225. The Court has repeatedly refused to strike down constitutional legislative actions for alleged illicit motives. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 292 (2000) (stating that the Court would uphold a statute based on an allegedly "illicit motive" if otherwise
constitutional); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.").
207 Palner,403 U.S. at 226-27.
208 Id. at 227.
209See id.
210 Id. at 226-27.
211 Id. at 227.
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because of color and supplied to another, they will be entitled to relief."212 This statement leaves open the possibility that litigants can obtain an injunction, absent statutory authority, if they petition to deseg-

regate an open public facility rather than praying to reopen closed
ones. The dictum is particularly intriguing because it comes at the very
end of the opinion, almost inviting a citizen lawsuit to rely on Section 1
to petition for an injunction. The likelihood that the Court would issue
such an injunction, however, is small given the absence of any decisive
precedent on the matter.213
One of Pahner's greatest weaknesses lies in the Court's failure to
analyze the extent to which the category "badges and incidents of servitude" extends to social discrimination, such as swimming pool segregation. Nowhere in the decision did the Court analyze whether racism and its coercive practices developed through forced, public
racial segregation. If the Court concluded that segregation in public
places stamped blacks with a badge of inferiority that limited autonomy rights and helped maintain a divisive society, granting an injunction would not have amounted to making new law. Instead, the Court
would have acknowledged that slavery extends beyond the plantation
system and continues to plague the United States. Such a finding also
would not have required the Court to micromanage "thousands of
towns and cities."214 Instead, it would have granted victims standing to
file claims pursuant to Section 1. Litigation, then, would have focused
on ripe issues.
The Court's decided avoidance of a timely issue was questionbegging. The Court in Palmer could have relied on Justice Harlan's
dissent in Hodges, where he asserted that Section 1 did much more
than free slaves: "by its own force, that Amendment destroyed slavery
and all its incidents and badges, and established freedom."215
Ten years after Palme,; the Court again considered whether the
first section of the Thirteenth Amendment went any farther than sunply abolishing slavery.216 In City of Memphis v. Greene, black citizens ob212 Paler,403

U.S. at 227.
Larry Pittman, however, has argued extensively that in Palmer the Supreme Court
recognized that claims can be brought directly pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment.
See Pittman, supra note 199, at 860 (stating that Palmer and Greene indicate the Supreme
Court removed "uncertainty regarding one's ability to bring a direct claim tnder the Thirteenth Amendment").
214Palmer,403 U.S. at 227.
215 Hodges, 203 U.S. at 27 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (dissenting from an opinion that
found the Thirteenth Amendment only abolished slavery in the literal sense).
216 Greene, 451 U.S. at 102, 124.
21s
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jected to the closing of a street running between a predominantly black
area and a white residential community The plaintiffs claimed that the
closing constituted a badge of servitude because it affected black citizens' ability to enjoy their property. 217 The Court held that the City's

motives were to protect children's safety and preserve residential quietude, not to discriminate. 2 18 The street closing constituted a "routine
219
burden of citizenship" and was not, therefore, a badge of servitude.
The Court in Greene did, however, emphasize the Thirteenth
Amendment's self-executing first section. 220 The decision firther india
cated that, under the right circumstances, the Court might allow 221
action.
congressional
absent
even
1,
claim directly under Section
Memphis had based its argument on Palner, claiming that absent direct
congressional enabling legislation the Court could not hold for the
plaintiffs.

222

The Court rejected Memphis's argument and stated that

"[p]ursuant to the authority created by § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress has enacted legislation to abolish both the conditions
223
of involuntary servitude and the 'badges and incidents of slavery.'"
This "exercise of that authority" the Court went on "is not inconsistent
with the view that the Amendment has self-executing force."224
Interestingly, the majority emphasized the possibility that courts
have the power to find that Section 1 extends beyond the abolition of
slavery:
In Jones, the Court left open the question whether § 1 of the
Amendment by its own terms did anything more than abolish slavery. It is also appropriate today to leave that question
open because a review of the justification for the official action challenged in this case demonstrates that its disparate
impact on black citizens could not, in any event, be fairly
225
characterized as a badge or incident of slavery.

Presumably, if the Court did decide that Section 1 extended beyond
mere abolition, it could enable the judiciary to use a methodological
analysis of discriminatory actions similar to the one Jones established
217 Id.
218 Id. at

126-28.

129.
id. at 124-29.
221 Greene, 451 U.S. at 124-29.
222Id. at 124.
223Id. at 124-25.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 125.
219 Id. at
220See
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for the legislature. 226 This dictum in Greene indicates that, given a justiciable controversy, the judiciary could decide whether a cause of action amounts to a badge or incident of servitude.
The Supreme Court has not subsequently returned to clarify this
important point. This leaves open the question of whether a private
claim is available under Section 1 absent an ancillary statute and, if
such a cause of action is available, whether it may be filed against public and private actors.
C. Summingup
Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence has emerged from the
narrow Court holding in the Civil Rights Cases. This case precluded
petitioners from seeking to end discriminatory practices in public accommodations. Had the Court come to the opposite conclusion, a
civil rights movement could have bourgeoned immediately after the
Civil War, and the Thirteenth Amendment could have helped end
many stigmatizing practices, such as racial segregation, which continned into the 1960s. By the 1896 Plessy decision, the Supreme Court
virtually nullified the Amendment's effectiveness, having become
complicit in legitimizing separate but equal practices. Finally, with the
1906 Hodges decision, the Supreme Court undermined Congress's
ability to prevent the perpetuation of any badges and incidents of servitude, except those directly associated with peonage and chattel slavery. Only in 1968, with the ruling in Jones, did the Court recognize its
earlier mistake. Jones returned the Thirteenth Amendment to its bastion among other cornerstones of federal civil rights.
Even today, the Thirteenth Amendment remains a sparsely used
and little-defined part of the Constitution. The Amendment has recently become ever more relevant because the Supreme Court has
narrowly construed legislative power under the Commerce Clause
and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 2 7 Supreme Court deci226 See 392 U.S. at 440 ("Surely Congress has the power uinder the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the
authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.").
2 7 William N. Eskridge,Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2322-23 (2002) (arguing that recent
cases are ahistorical in their approaches and that "[i]t is now unclear how much authority
Congress has to implement the politics of remediation for women, lesbigay people, the
disabled"); Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. Rv.
1541, 1577 (2002) (commenting that "the Court intended, by placing such stringent requirements on the effects test in [United States v.] Lopez and Morrison, to police the limits of
Congress's Commerce Clause authority, regardless of whether Congress itself finds that the

HeinOnline -- 45 B.C. L. Rev. 349 2003-2004

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 45:307

sions, such as Kinel v. Florida Board of Regents, United States v. Morrison,
and City of Boerne v. Flores, have restricted Congress's ability to enact
antidiscrimination laws. 228 At the same time, the Supreme Court has

not similarly limited Jones and the subsequent cases addressing Congress's Thirteenth Amendment power. Federalism developments in
the areas of Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment common
law demand a creative approach, which can be found in a new commitment to Thirteenth Amendment civil rights activism.
IV.

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

The next issue to analyze is whether the Thirteenth Amendment
alternative can bolster civil rights cases that have traditionally relied
on the Commerce Clause for their authority. This analysis requires a
preliminary explanation of the case law regarding the regulation of
interstate commerce and then a critical comparison to Thirteenth
Amendment authority and its potentials. The Thirteenth Amendment
is not susceptible to the economic interpretation that the Court has
recently given the Commerce Clause.
Commerce Clause jurisprudence developed during the New Deal
and established the federal government's authority to regulate activities
integral to the national economy.229 The U.S. Supreme Court even extended the national government's power over interstate commerce to
the regulation of private farms growing crops for the farmer's consump-

tion. 230 The New Deal Court learned from Lochner v. New York what
activity affects commerce or places the 'affecting commerce' language in a statute and
leaves that finding to a jury"); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term-Foreword: We
the Court, 115 HARV. L. REv. 4, 14-15 (2001) (asserting that the Court's recent cases indicate a willingness to cast aside long-established precedent, "especially those limiting Congress's power tinder Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"). But see Randy E. Barnett,
The OriginalMeaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 101, 103-04, 146 (2001)
(writing in favor of an economic, restricted application of the Commerce Clause); Diane
McGinsey, The Commerce Clause and FederalismAfter Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing
the frisdictional-ElementLoophole, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1675, 1682-85, 1730-37 (2002) (explaining that Lopez and Morrison constrict Congress's power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce and proposing a further linitation of Commerce Clause
powers, using a nexus test).
228 See infra notes 297-307 and accompanying text.
2 29
James G. Pope recently wrote a fascinating article on the labor movement's decision
to base labor rights activism on the Commerce Clause instead of the Thirteenth Amendment.
See generallyJames G. Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the
Shapingof American ConstitutionalLaw, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2002). Pope's emphasis on labor's constitutional freedoms is beyond the scope of this Article. See id. at 15.
230 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-29 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 because family farm consumption had a cumulative effect on the
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seemed, for many years, to be a sustained lesson not to meddle in rational federal laws regulating interstate commerce.2 3 1 The Court's deference on matters of commerce carried over into the civil rights arena.
By the 1960s, constitutional lawyers regularly resorted to the
Commerce Clause in litigation. Part of their aim was to adopt strategies to circumvent the eighty-year-old state action restrictions in United
States v. Harris and the Civil Rights Cases.232 Civil rights leaders, too,
recognized that private acts of discrimination violated the individual
right of self-determination and wanted the federal government to
2 33
provide a remedy against private actors.

To that end, Congress passed numerous 1960s civil rights statutes
relying, in large part, on its Commerce Clause authority. The success
of presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson in spurring a
civil rights agenda culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.234 That

statute continues today to provide remedies against a variety of discriminations, including those perpetrated in public accommodations,
employment, and housing. The Supreme Court, under the leadership
of Chief Justice Earl Warren, used the Commerce Clause instead of
post-Reconstruction jurisprudence on Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers to justify Congress's enactment of laws against private
discrimination.235
national wheat market). United States v. Lopez did not overrule Wickard, but called it "the
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity." 514 U.S.
549, 560 (1995).
231 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937) ("Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if
they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.").
232 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-12 (1883) (holding that Congress's Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 enforcement powers are limited to state action); United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 644 (1883) (invalidating the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22,
§ 2, 17 Stat. 13, which punished private conspiracies).
233 Even though many, including the Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, and constitutional scholars, like Gerald Gunther, counseled to use the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Solicitor General, Archibald Cox, understood that without overruling the Civil Rights Cases
such a suggestion was a nonstarter. Seth P. Waxman, Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role
of the Solicitor General, 75 IND. L.J. 1297, 1312 (2000). Because stare decisis indicated that
the likelihood of overruling the 1883 decision was small, Cox convinced the President to
follow the Commerce Clause strategy. See id. at 1310-13.
234 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
235 SeeJim Chen, Come Back to the Nickle and Five: Tracing the Warren Courts Pursuit of
EqualJustice Under the Law, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1203, 1231-32 (2002); see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a(b) (2003) (prohibiting public place discrimination and segregation "affecting

HeinOnline -- 45 B.C. L. Rev. 351 2003-2004

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 45:307

In a 1964 watershed case, Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United
States, the Supreme Court determined that Congress could use its
power to regulate interstate commerce to prevent a private motel
from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, or national
origin. The Motel refused to rent rooms to African Americans while
advertising nationally and serving clientele from interstate highways. 236 The Court held that the Motel's refusals caused blacks to be
"subject of discrimination in transient accommodations," forcing
them to travel greater distances to find another motel or stay with
friends. 237 Oddly, it was the Motel that raised the Thirteenth Amendment claim, arguing that requiring it to provide accommodations to
unwanted customers would subject the business to involuntary servitude. 23 8 The Court rejected the Motel's reasoning and held that the

Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress authority to pass rationally
designed antidiscrimination laws for bettering the general welfare.
Nevertheless, the Court refused to reverse the Civil Rights Cases Fourteenth Amendment bar against federal laws prohibiting public ac239
commodation discrimination.
That same year, the Court decided, in Katzenbach v. McClung, that
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 constitutionally prohibits a family-owned
restaurant from discriminating against potential patrons. 240 In the district court, the plaintiffs relied on a Thirteenth Anendment argument. The trial court found the Amendment irrelevant to the issue
because it neither permitted nor denied Congress power to pass laws
against discrimination. 241 The trial court also found there was no
"close and substantial relation" between the restaurant and interstate
commerce. 242 The Supreme Court did not follow the "close and substantial relation" test. Instead, it determined that Congress had a "rational basis" for adopting the Act's regulatory scheme based on evidence that segregated restaurants hindered business, inhibited travel,
interstate commerce or supported in their activities by State action as places of public accommodation"). The Court noted in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States that "the
history of the Act indicates that Congress based the Act on § 5 and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as its power to regulate interstate commerce
under Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution." 379 U.S. 241, 249 (1964).
236 Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 243.
237 Id. at 252-53.
28 Id. at 244.
239 Id. at 278; CivilRights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
2- 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964).
241 Id. at 297.
242

Id.
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and therefore detrimentally affected interstate commerce.243 The
Court refused, however, to reach the Thirteenth Amendment issue.
For decades, Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung stood for the
deferential principle that Congress could pass any necessary laws rationally connected to interstate commerce. The Court did not secondguess congressional factfinding when it met this minimum threshold.244 So long as the legislature did not pass a law based on arbitrary

and concocted findings, the Court time and again found statutes constitutional. Prior to 1997, as Harold J. Krent pointed out, the Court
also did not categorically require that all legislation with constitutional implications be supported by legislative findings. 245 Such a requirement "unquestionably would fundamentally alter the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature." 246
Although use of Commerce Clause authority was a wellestablished civil rights strategy by the 1990s, recent Court decisions
put the continued viability of this strategy into doubt. For example,
the Rehnquist majority reduced Congress's effectiveness in enacting
legislation pursuant to its Commerce Clause power in United States v.
Morrison, where the Court struck down a national law prohibiting
gender-motivated violence, and United States v. Lopez, where it found
unconstitutional a federal statute against the possession of firearms
near a school. 247 In the name of federalism, the Court's rulings both
diminished Congress's power to act on rational findings that something affects interstate commerce and increased judicial oversight
authorit: 248 These decisions make the Thirteenth Amendment ever
more relevant.
243 Id.

at 303-05.
United States v.Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 666 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("This
Court has not previously held that Congress must document the existence of a problem in
every State prior to proposing a national solution.").
245Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative
Findings, 46 CASE NV.RES. L. REV. 731, 732-33 (1996). For an earlier rendition of the same
point, see Archibald Cox, Foreword: ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 105 (1966) ("The Court does not review the sufficiency of the
evidence in the record to support congressional action.... No case has ever held that a
record is constitutionally required.").
246 Krent, supra note 245, at 732-33.
247 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551-52, 561. Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Clarence Thomas have joined in recent opinions reducing Congress's Commerce Clause power.
In similar fashion, the Court encroached on Congress's Section 5 Fourteenth Amendment
authority both in Morrison and Kind v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000).
248 The Court's recent trend of striking laws because of an inadequate congressional
record is highly questionable on precedential, constitutional, and practical grounds. A.
244
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The Court first narrowly construed congressional Commerce
Clause power in LopeZ.249 The case dealt with the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990, which provided criminal penalties for persons who
250
Chief Justice Wilknowingly possessed firearms in a school zone.
liam Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found the Act unconstitutional. 25 1 The ruling in Lopez was the first time in sixty years the Court
found a federal statute exceeded Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. 252 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion weakened Congress's Commerce Clause power by forgoing the rational basis test inquiry and, instead, examining whether the law had a "substantial
effect" on interstate commerce. 253 The Court then found no congressional showing that guns carried in a school zone had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 25 4 Rehnquist's language also indicated
that the Commerce Clause would henceforth only apply to cases in"
volving "economic enterprise. 25
Justice Stephen Breyer, writing in dissent, found no basis for deviating from the rational basis test. He argued that Congress can regulate any activity "significantly (or substantially)" affecting national
commerce. 256 Justice Breyer pointed out that, contrary to the majority's holding, Commerce Clause cases have not consistently used the
"substantial effects" label: "I use the word 'significant' because the
word 'substantial' implies a somewhat narrower power than recent
precedent suggests. But to speak of 'substantial effect' rather than
'significant effect' would make no difference in this case." 257

Christopher Bryant & TimothyJ. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New
"On the Record" ConstitutionalReview ofFederalStatutes, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 328, 389 (2001).
249
514 U.S. at 558-68.
25018 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2) (A) (2000) (forbidding individuals from possessing "a firearm
at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone").
211Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
252 In 1935, the Court had struck a law that regulated the wages and hours of an intrastate business. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550-51 (1935).
253Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63.
254Id. at 561-65.
255Id. at 558-61.
256Id. at 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
257Id. at 616 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (citations omitted). At the other end of the spectrum
from Breyer wasJustice Clarence Thomas, who regarded the substantial effects test to be an
excessive grant of congressional power: "[W] e must.., respect a constitutional line that does
not grant Congress power over all that substantially affects interstate commerce." Id. at 593
(Thomas, J, concurring). He believed the substantial effects test would give Congress practically limitless power: "Under onr jurisprudence, if Congress passed an omnibus 'substantially
affects interstate commerce' statute, purporting to regulate every aspect of human existence,
the Act apparently would be constitutional." Id. at 600 (ThomasJ., concurring).
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If the Court had relied on Justice Breyer's reasoning, it likely
would have determined Congress did not exceed its authority Guns
in schools significantly undermine national education and thus adversely affect interstate and foreign commerce. In addition, Congress
could have legitimately found that, on a national level, guns have a
substantial effect on children's education. The majority's reliance on
the substantial effect test allowed it to second-guess the adequacy of
the congressional record and conclude that possessing guns close to
schools was not a commercial activity. 258 The Court, ultimately, refised
to rely on the government's claim of expertise.
The decision in Lopez apparently also was based on an
unreflective concern about congressional overreaching. One of "the
implications of the Government's arguments" is that "under the Government's 'national productivity' reasoning, Congress could regulate
any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of
individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and child
custody), for example." 59 These same concerns equally apply to other
federal statutes directly impacting family life such as the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act. 260 Similarly traditional federal civil rights claims, such as those
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), often finction concurrently
with state remedies for racial or gender discrimination. 261 In Lopez, the
Court usurped congressional Commerce Clause powers by granting
itself oversight in an area of decision making that the Constitution
granted to the people's representatives. 262
Five years later, the Court in Moruison relied on Lopez to find unconstitutional the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), a federal
statute that provided a private remedy for gender-motiv-ated violence.2 63
The ChiefJustice again wrote for the majority, fiurther embedding into
jurisprudence his views on the centrality of economics to Congress's

258 See

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
259 Id. at 564.
260 Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 42 U.S.C. § 666 (2003)
(easing interstate
child support); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2003)
(providing full faith and credit for child custody decisions).
261Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence
Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 CORNELL L.
REv.109, 134-35 (2000).
262See Kramer, supra note 227, at 138-41.
26S 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994); Morfison, 529 U.S. at 601-02, 619, 627.
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Commerce Clause power.264 Unlike the congressional record on the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, Congress had provided abundant information about the interstate effects of gender violence. Nevertheless, the
Court did not find sufficient evidence to prove that violence against
women substantially affected interstate commerce. Even on its face,
without any fact gathering, the connection between the inability of
women to reach their potential when confronted by gender bias appears obvious. But, instead of relying on presupposition, Congress bolstered the factual record with a "mountain of data," including information from no less than nine congressional hearings and from gender
bias task forces in twenty-one states, which was amassed over four
years. 265 The Court's rejection of Congress's inductions from the evidence went beyond Lopez and granted the judiciary even more control
in determining whether congressional findings adequately justS, civil

rights laws passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
The Court disregarded the compiled data on the grounds that
violent gender-motivated crimes "are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity." 266 This reasoning seems to be a return to judicial
scrutiny reminiscent of Lochnei era due process review.

267

To further

curtail congressional overreaching, the Court concluded that Congress could not enact law "based solely on that conduct's aggregate
effect on interstate commerce." 268 The aggregation doctrine, the
Court held, was inapplicable in cases of gender-motivated violence
that is "not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce."269

264 Chief Justice Rehnquist had made his concerns known years before Morrison, in a
concurring opinion to Hodel v. Viginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, where he espoused the view that the congressional regulation of commerce should have a "substantial
effect" on interstate commerce. 452 U.S. 264, 312 (1981) (Rehnquist,J., concurring). Otherwise, he stated, "one could easily get the sense from this Court's opinions that the federal
system exists only at the sufferance of Congress." Id. at 308 (Rehnquist,J., concurring).
265 Morrison,529 U.S. at 628-31 (SouterJ., dissenting).
266 Id. at 613.
267 See id. at 644 (SouterJ., dissenting) ("[I]n the minds of the majority there is a new

animating theory that makes categorical formalism seem useful again. Just as the old formalism had value in the service of an economic conception, the new one is useful in serving a conception of federalism."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (1999) (Soutei, J.,
dissenting) ("The resemblance of today's state sovereign immunity to the Lochiner era's industrial due process is striking."); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 165-69 (1996)
(SouterJ., dissenting) (comparing recent Supreme Court federalist approaches to Lochner).
268 Moryison, 529 U.S. at 599.
269

Id. at 617-18.
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The dissents in Morfison, written by Justices David Souter and
Stephen Breyer, sought to restore the rational basis test. 270 Justice

Souter regarded the congressional record on the VAWA as more convincing than those in Heart of Atlanta Motel and McCiung.271 Although
the majority did not overrule those two earlier cases, it cast doubt on
their vitality because Heart of Atlanta Motel and MeCiung,just as Morrison, involved civil rights protections created on the basis of Congress's
Commerce Clause authority. The Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel determined that racial discrimination had a "disruptive effect ...

on

commercial intercourse." 272 The Court in MeClung found there was
replete testimony that discrimination at restaurants had a "highly restrictive effect upon interstate travel by Negroes." 273 Similarly, Congress documented that gender-based violence often forced victims to
quit jobs and reduced "the mobility of employees and their production and consumption of goods shipped in interstate commerce." 274
Given the Court's recent propensity to bevel away at Congress's
Commerce Clause authority, the Thirteenth Amendment remains an
important alternative for civil rights litigation. A Commerce Clause
approach is unduly susceptible to economic arguments that an intolerant act is not substantially connected to interstate commerce. Although the Court found that violence against women is not an economically directed activity, that finding is irrelevant in deciding
whether the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to
prevent violence against women. The Thirteenth Amendment perspective allows congressmen to review the connection of gendermotivated violence to slavery. Such violence was regularly perpetrated
against slaves on plantations, and women, as Andrew Koppelman has
pointed out, were particularly vulnerable to sexual brutality by masters
and others who exploited their strengths and positions of power.27 5
Federal laws relying on the Thirteenth Amendment need only be
rationally related to the vestiges of slavocracy. The Court has never
270 Id. at 637-38, 647-52 (Souter, J., dissenting) (referring to congressional evidence
that violence against women affects interstate commerce); id. at 663 (BreyerJ., dissenting)
("I continue to agree with Justice Souter that the Court's traditional 'rational basis' approach is sufficient.").
271 Id. at 635 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that sexual assault and domestic
violence
caused a loss of $3 billion in 1990 and $5 to $10 billion in 1993).
272379 U.S. at 257.
273 379 U.S. at 300.
274 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 634, 636 (SouterJ., dissenting).
275Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv.
480, 508-09 (1990).
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overturned the Jones rational basis test. Had Congress at least partly
relied on it, the Court might have deferred to Congress, given legislative findings that gender-motivated violence is rationally related to the
incidents of servitude and that the VAWA was a necessary and proper
means of dealing with such acts. The only question left for the Court
was "reasonably adapted to
would then have been whether the VAWA
276
Constitution."
the
by
the end permitted
The Commerce Clause does little, if anything, to invoke the legacy
of slavery or to look at its remaining manifestations, making it susceptible to a purely economic interpretation like the one the Rehnquist majority has adopted. Instead, the Commerce Clause bodes back to what
we may call Lockean social religion, which elevates property above the
Preamble's guarantee to safeguard citizens' life and liberty for the general welfare. 277 After all, Congress has had the power to regulate all
manner of commerce between states at least since 1824, pursuant to Gib278 In fact, one
bons v. Ogden, when slavery flourished in the United States.
author has argued that the Commerce Clause was an important part of
the Founders' compromise with slavocracy at the Constitutional Convention. 279 Even though the Clause granted Congress the power to regulate

the
the slave trade between states, the national government tolerated
280
practice, and some antebellum congressmen even owned slaves.

By its very terms, the Thirteenth Amendment is not given to a
neutral reading; indeed, it gives the federal legislature the power to
enforce the liberty guarantees of the Declaration of Independence
and Preamble to the Constitution in the context of both private and
state-sponsored discrimination. Further, the Thirteenth Amendment
extends to interstate and intrastate activities, regardless of the impact
276 Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 262 (explaining, in the context of the Commerce
Clause, the use of the rational basis test).
277 U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.").
278 See generally 22 U.S. (9 'Wheat.) 1 (1824).
279 PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND CoMITV 24
(1981).
280 See Charles H. Cosgrove, The Declarationof Independence in ConstitutionalInterpretation:
A Selective History and Analysis, 32 U. RicH. L. REv. 107, 123 (1997) (stating that Congress
had power under the Commerce Clause to regulate "incoming slave trade" and failure to
do so "owed more to the bad faith of the American people than to any inherent constitutional restraints"); RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 695, 702 n.54 (2002) (stating that even if
Congress could not regulate intrastate slave trade it certainly could have done so on an
interstate level).
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on conmerce. The Amendment thereby recognizes that the arbitrary
restriction of freedom is not merely an economic harm, but one that
affects society in a more profound way. This does not mean that a
Thirteenth Amendment civil rights approach should displace Cornmerce Clause efforts under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Rather, I
mean to stress the continued vitality ofJones in establishing Congress's
broad interpretive power at a time when the Court in Lopez and Morrison has made the passage of new civil rights legislation increasingly
difficult to justify on Commerce Clause grounds.
The role of the Thirteenth Amendment in employment discrimination cases is illustrative of its importance. The link between
employment discrimination and slavery is obvious, as slavery directly
restricted blacks from choosing professions. Nationally discriminatory
practices barred blacks from competitive jobs. Congress can, therefore, rationally determine that exclusion of a group from equal participation in the workplace is related to forced subservience and an
impediment to commerce. Based on this finding, Congress can pass
legislation prohibiting employment discrimination currently not covered under the scope of federal laws. For instance, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which Congress passed on the basis of its
Commerce Clause powers, is more restrictive than the Thirteenth
Amendment. Title VII permits the federal government to regulate
employers with at least fifteen employees. 28 1 Employment claims based
on the Thirteenth Amendment need not be so restrictive.
The limited congressional action taken in the employment arena
is promising. Modern day peonage cases were successfilly prosecuted
under the Anti-Peonage Act, which Congress passed pursuant to its
Thirteenth Amendment Section 2 authority. 28 2 Even absent new legislation, the Supreme Court has already found that § 1981, a Reconstruction-era statute based on Congress's Thirteenth Amendment
authority provides a private remedy to persons working for employers
with fewer than fifteen people. 283 In dictum the Court stated in 1994

28142 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2003).
282 See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944) ("The undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by the Anti-peonage Act was not merely to end slavery
but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United
States."); Fox, supra note 144, at 122-23 (noting Congress's interpretive use of its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power in passing the Anti-Peonage Act).
283 See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Inportance of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 596, 601-03 (1988) (discussing the relationship of employment race discrimination claims brought under § 1981 and Title VII). The Court has found that the
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that "[elven in the employment context, § 1981's coverage is broader
than Title VII's, for Title VII applies only to employers84with 15 or
more employees, whereas § 1981 has no such limitation."2
At times, the Thirteenth Amendment strategy is also preferable to
the Commerce Clause alternative because of the Amendment's unique
communicative value. 285 Tying discrimination to the economy is not
enough to alter racist views that have, in some circles, been culturally
condoned since the country's founding. A legal framework designed to
protect liberty and improve the general welfare conveys a powerful
message about this country's underlying commitments. Legal norms
can influence a people's desires and interests. They create entitlements
society must honor.286 Laws protecting human rights on the basis of the
Thirteenth Amendment effectively communicate a federal commitment to prosecuting demagogic conduct resembling the badges of involuntary servitude. Such legal remedies "express recognition of injury
for how the
and reaffirmation of the underlying normative principles
28 7
relevant [social] relationships are to be constituted."
The Thirteenth Amendment is a more obvious source for civil
rights protections than the Commerce Clause. The former protects individual autonomy against state and private interference, and recent
Supreme Court decisions indicate the latter principally concerns regulation of interstate economic transactions. The Thirteenth Amendment
was ratified to increase the federal government's ability to assure universal freedom and general welfare, and the Commerce Clause was included to provide a central authority for regulating commercial interactions across state borders. There is no doubt after McClung and Heart
of Atlanta Motel that the Commerce Clause is also relevant to ending
racist practices-even Lopez and Morison did not overrule those cases.
With the Court's trend away from its earlier deference to congressional

remedies under Title VII and § 1981 are "separate, distinct, and independent." Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975).
-81 Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 304 n.3 (1994) (discussing § 101 of
Civil Rights Act of 1991).
28 See Pope, supra note 229, at 119-20 (describing how words and legal text can facilitate "social movement mobilization, dispense symbolic incentives, undermine the legitimacy of established social norms, and produce numerous other effects"); Tsesis, supra note
3, at 545-58 (discussing the centrality of symbolism for unifying social movements).
286 See Frances Kahn Zemans, Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of Lazo in the Political
System, 77 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 690, 697 (1983) (explaining how legal norms influence perceptions of desires, wants, and interests).
287 See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theolies of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1529 (2000).
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Commerce Clause authority however, the Thirteenth Amendment's
centrality has become manifest.
V.

THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

The substantive provisions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments emerged from the United States' historic commitment
to freedom. The country's primary statements of national purpose,
the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution, made liberty a foremost guarantee of federal government, but
neither manifesto had an explicit enforcement provision. The makers
of the Constitution, as Justice Louis Brandeis explained in a dissenting opinion, set out "to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness.... They conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone." 288
The Thirteenth Amendment disengages the principle of freedom
from the original Constitution's favoritism for property-owning
whites. The Amendment makes the liberty to live an uncoerced, selfdirected life a universal right. Adopted in the immediate aftermath of
the Civil War, the Amendment was designed both to abolished slavery
and to protect people's right to act independent of arbitrary coercion. Its grant of enforcement authority bestows Congress with the
power to protect the right of individuals to make and pursue meaningful life decisions.
The Fourteenth Amendment too secures normative values essential to living a good life, although the state action requirement sets a
limit on its effectiveness that the Thirteenth Amendment does not
impose. 289 The U.S. Supreme Court has only recently limited the civil
rights potential of the Commerce Clause; on the other hand, Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence was narrowly interpreted at least as

early as the holdings in the Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil Rigits
Cases.2 90 The Court's current state-oriented federalism has brought

2

88Olmstead v.United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (BrandeisJ, dissenting).
289See Robin West, Universalism, Liberal Theory, and the Problem of Gay Marriage, 25 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 705, 706 (1998) (writing about the rationalist conception of human nature,
considered to be characteristic of the liberty secured under the Fourteenth Amendment);
Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Note, Towards a New Equal Protection: Two Kinds of Equality, 12 LAW
& INEQ. 381, 422 (1994) (writing that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment stands for the promise of a good life).
_)0CivilRights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,
60-63 (1872).
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into sharper relief a comparison between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
A. Thirteenth and FourteenthAmendment Freedoins
Both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments protect pluralistic freedom; nonetheless, each has a unique role in the constitutional scheme. Although this Article is not the appropriate place for a
detailed analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment, some examination
about its relative place to the Thirteenth Amendment will help demonstrate better how these amendments can be integrated. The normative principles on which they are both established require the federal
government to use its limited power to improve the common good by
291
protecting individual liberties.
To begin, I regard the Thirteenth Amendment to be a more
specific and unequivocal guarantee of civil liberties than the Fourteenth Anmendment. This Part demonstrates that the Thirteenth
Amendment remains the principal constitutional source requiring the
federal government to protect individual liberties against arbitrary
private and public infringements that resemble the incidents of involuntary servitude. I believe the Thirteenth Amendment's two sections
take a three-part approach to freedom: its first section guarantees
freedom from arbitrary domination; and its second section authorizes
Congress to enact federal laws protecting people's coequal liberties to
establish meaning for their lives.
The Thirteenth Amendment is an even more unambiguous federal mandate than the Fourteenth Amendment. The prohibition
against involuntary servitude is absolute, thus any incidents or badges
of it are ineluctably proscribed. The Thirteenth Amendment vests
Congress with the power to protect the unobtrusive exercise of freedom against arbitrary infringement. In at least some cases, such as
those involving specific instances of slaver); not even a compelling state
interest can justi , a state or private infringement of autonomy.
hi contrast, the state may infringe on the personal liberties otherwise secured under the Fourteenth Amendment where there is an overriding public interest. The U.S. Supreme Court, in City of Cleburne v.
291 I have more fully explained my ethical point of view in TsEsIs, supra note 35, at ch.
10. Essentially my view is that the Preamble to the Constitution requires the federal government to protect individual liberties in order to achieve the common good. See id.; see
also Alexander Tsesis, Eliminating the Destitution ofAmerica's Homcless: A Fair FederalApproach,
10 TEMP. POL. & Cv. R'rs. L. REV. 103, 121-23 (2000).
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Cleburne Living Center; carved out this exception to the Fourteenth
Amendment's proscription of race, alienage, and national origin
classifications. 292 Such laws "are subjected to strict scrutiny" analysis and
will only be found constitutional if they "serve a compelling state interest." 293 The Court later clarified that governmental restraints on fundamental freedoms must be "specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish" tfie compelling purpose.2 94 Such a restrictive law cannot be
"merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible
state
policy."295 In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, a legislature
can abridge ftindamental liberty interests for compelling public rea296
sons.
The Court's most recent decisions on the Fourteenth Amendment
adopt a "responsive," rather than a proactive, reading of Congress's
Section 5 powers. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court invalidated the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, in part because the statute was "so
out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."297 The case limited Congress's Section 5 powers to
passing congruent laws for remedying state violations of Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees: 2 98 'The Fourteenth Amendment's history
confirms the remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the Enforcement Clause." The Court's rationale was based on statements made
during congressional debates over the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the effect that "[t] he proposed Amendment gave Congress too
much legislative power at the expense of the existing constitutional
structure." 299 In a recent article, Ruth Colker maintained that the Court
misleadingly resorted to the record of the debates that preceded passage of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment.3 00 The Court relied on
the statements of four congressmen to bolster the Boerne rationale
without ever mentioning that only one of them voted for the proposed
'92 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
293Id.
24 Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986); see also Shaw v.Hunt, 517

U.S. 899, 908 (1996).
295McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
296See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
297 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (emphasis added). The Court reiterated this "responsive"
language in Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents. 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000); see infra notes 302-303
and accompanying text.
298Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
299Id. at 520-21.
300
See Colker, supra note 62, at 797-817.
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Fourteenth Amendment.30 1 Relying on the understanding of the
ratification opponents is a dubious method ofjudicial interpretation.
The Court maintained the remedial interpretation of Congress's
Section 5 power in Kinel v. Florida Board of Regents, finding that Congress overstepped its enforcement authority when it extended the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act's ("ADEA") applicability to states
and local governments. 3 0 2 The Court in Kinel held that Congress's decision to apply the ADEA to states was "out of proportion to its supposed remedial or preventive objectives." 30 3 Other recent cases dealing with Section 5 have applied the responsive "proportionality and
30 4
the VAWA,30 5 the
congruency" test to the Patent Remedy Act,
30 6
and the Family and Medical Leave
Americans with Disabilities Act,
"FMLA").307
(the
Act

In addition to authorizing laws that responsively remedy specific
acts of past discrimination, the Thirteenth Amendment also grants
30 8
Congress the power to pass laws that are substantive guarantees.
Pursuant to the Amendment, the standard for passing "effective legislation" is that it be "rationally" related to "the badges and the incidents of servitude." Under the Thirteenth Amendment, the federal
legislature may, and indeed should, pass laws that help liberty thrive.
Congress may use its Section 2 power to pass laws that protect the
non-intrusive use of personal freedom and punish its abridgment.
301 See id. Specifically, in Boerne the Court quoted Representatives Hale, Hotchkiss, and
Rogers, and Senator Stewart. 521 U.S. at 520-21. "Of the Representatives quoted by the
Court, only Representative Hotchkiss voted for ratification of the Amendment. Representative Hale abstained and Representative Rogers voted against the measure." Colker, supra
note 62, at 792.
302 528 U.S. at 86.
303 Id. at 82.
304 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
647 (1999) ("The Patent Remedy Act ... is particularly incongruous in light of the scant
support for the predicate unconstitutional conduct .... ").
305 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S 598, 625-26 (2000) ("[A]s we have phrased it in
more recent cases, prophylactic legislation under § 5 must have a 'congruence or proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end.'") (quoting FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 639; Boemne, 521 U.S. at 526).
306Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) ("Congress is the
final authority as to desirable public policy, but in order to authorize private individuals to
recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by
the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation.").
307 Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1982 (2003) ("We believe
that Congress' chosen remedy, the family-care leave provision of the FMLA, is 'congruent
and proportional to the targeted violation .... '") (quoting Garrett,531 U.S. at 374).
30 8
jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
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Moreover, Congress may pass civil legislation, more sensitive to hitman rights concerns than §§ 1981 and 1982, allowing for private
compensation. Congress's enforcement power under the Thirteenth
Amendment not only aims proportionately and congruently to prevent interference with fundamental rights, which is the extent of
Congress's authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, but also enables the federal government to substantiate the promises of freedom
found in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble.30 9
The Thirteenth Amendment's lack of a state action requirement
is another reason for sometimes preferring the Thirteenth to the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court created this dichotomy
as early as 1883, in the Civil Rights Cases, and has never strayed from it.
The Court then found that the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power is limited to state actions:
It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal
law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes
of redress against the operation of State laws, and the action
of state officers executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment.
Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured by way of prohibition against State laws and State proceedings affecting
those rights and privileges, and by power given to Congress to
legislate for the purpose of carrying such prohibition into effect: and such legislation must necessarily be predicated upon

309 U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States,

and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). The Court first connected governmental

interference with the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases, finding
that it only protected citizens from state interference with the privileges and immunities of
national, but not state, citizenship. See 83 U.S. at 60-63. Likewise, the Equal Protection
Clause prevents interference with the exercise of fundamental rights "unless it is supported
by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests." See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). "The Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause has a substantive component that 'provides heightened protection
against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests ....
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000) (quoting Glucksberg,521 U.S. at 720).
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be disuch supposed State laws or State proceedings, and
310
rected to the correction of their operation and effect.
The Civil Rights Cases accorded with post-Reconstruction political decisions, such as the Compromise of 1877, which favored Northern and
Southern reconciliation at the expense of meaningful improvements
31
for blacks. '
Boerne took the state action requirement for granted, and further
straight-jacketed Congress by finding that Section 5 allows it "to enforce" but not "to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." 31 2 The Supreme Court also embraced the state action requirement in United States v. Morrison.3 13 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, explained that the Court would not deviate from "the
time-honored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very
terms, prohibits only state action." 31 4 Moriison asserted that it was
based on the doctrine of stare decisis and the "insight attributable to
the Members of the Court at that time," because they had "intimate
knowledge and familiarity with the events surrounding the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment."31 The Court's historical analysis
again failed to account for the events immediately preceding the Civil
Rights Cases. ChiefJustice Bradley wrote the decision in the Civil Rights
Cases shortly after he cast the deciding vote on the electoral commission that gave Rutherford B. Hayes the presidency and secured the
Compromise of 1877.316 Bradley and the other members of the electoral commission abandoned blacks to the injustices of segregation.
The Rehnquist majority drew on precedent filled with racist undertones instead of advancing progressive arguments born from the
abolitionist movement. The Court, in Moriison, also quoted from another 1883 case, United States v. Harris,for the principle that Section 5
refers to "[s]tate action exclusively, and not to any action of private
310

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11-12.

311 See supra note

102.

U.S. at 533.
313 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000). Both Boerne and ZMorfison failed to evaluate the Court's interpretation of "enforce" in Thirteenth Amendment cases, relying instead on the Civil Rights
Cases "niggardly" interpretation of that term. Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscainination
Agenda, 111 YALE LJ. 1141, 1154-56 (2002).
314Morfison, 529 U.S. at 621.
315 Id. at 622.
316 Fox, supra note 144, at 159. From that year, the Court began using the Constitution
to avoid the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g., Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485,
488-89 (1877) (finding Louisiana violated the Commerce Clause by requiring the desegregation of public conveyance).
312 521
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individuals."31 7 Haris struck section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, which
had made it criminal for two or more people to conspire to deprive
anyone from enjoying the equal protection of the law or the privileges
and immunities of national citizenship.3 18 The Court's continued reliance on these two decisions, both of which moved the country in the
direction of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), indicates the present-day
difficulty of using a Fourteenth Amendment strategy to end injustices
like violence against women or hate crhnes generally.
Ever since it decided the Slaughter-House Cases, Civil Rights Cases,
and Haris,the Court has severely handicapped national power in the
area of the Fourteenth Amendment. But beginning with Jones, the
Court expanded federal authority to prevent interference with civil
liberties.
The schema proposed herein authorizes Congress to pass laws
preserving the right to freely pursue goals that do not arbitrarily interfere with others' legitimate interests. This schema provides both a
positive grant of power, in so far as it recognizes that the Thirteenth
Amendment provides Congress the power to expand opportunities,
and a negative grant of freedom, because it prohibits the government
and individuals from intrusively abusing others' autonomy. Such a
perspective makes more evident Congress's authority to decide rationally that a law, such as the VAWA, is necessary for protecting
women's freedom of movement against misogynistic intrusions into
their lives. A law against other hate crimes would likewise use federal
power to punish and prevent the types of interference with liberty
that the Reconstruction Congress sought to end.
Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment provides a substantive alternative for passing civil rights laws. This interpretation of the Amendment is based on Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has
consistently found that the Thirteenth Amendment does not contain
any equivalent to the Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement. Congress has great latitude, pursuant to its Thirteenth
Amendment Section 2 power, to end any remaining vestiges of servitude and their concomitant forms of subordination. The judiciary, I
argued above, should use Section 1 even absent congressional action.3 19 The practices to which both sections of the Thirteenth
Amendment apply are usually not overtly tied to forced labor; they
317

Mlorrison, 529 U.S. at 621 (quoting Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883)) (internal quo-

tations omitted).
318 106 U.S. at 644.
319 See supra Part III.B.
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may be masked in institutional discrimination and private behavior
that arbitrarily denies victims the opportunity to live meaningful lives.
B. Pertinent Rights
The Supreme Court has done little to examine what civil liberties
Congress may protect pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment. Instead, the Court has used various constitutional provisions to establish
its decisions concerning privacy and liberty rights. For example, the
Court has held repeatedly that liberty rights are imbedded in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which gives the Court
little guidance about which liberties it protects. 3 20 Typically, the Court
simply asserts that a human decision, such as choosing whether to
travel, is a historically fundamental liberty that is immune from state
infringement absent a compelling state interest.3 21 This kind of unspecific historical reasoning exposes holdings to the originalist detraction that courts are engaging in judicial lawmaking.3 22 Critics of opinions such as Roe v. Wade have called the Court's reflective method
"unprincipled," "illegitimate," and lacking "connection with any value
See, e.g., Moore v.City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-500 (1977) (determining that the right of family members to live together was a family liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (stating that "[t] his Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (finding that certain
privacy rights are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty"); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1971) (holding that patient
identification requirements of a substance abuse act did not violate "any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment").
321See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1982) (Brennan,J., concurring) ("In light
of the unquestioned historic recognition of the principle of free interstate migration, and
of its role in the development of the Nation, we need not feel impelled to 'ascribe the
source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision.'" (quoting
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969))); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335,
360 (1972) (finding the right to travel a fundamental right that the state cannot withhold
absent a substantial and compelling reason); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 164 (1972) (finding that loafing and strolling are "historically part of the amenities of
life as we have known them").
322 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Lato System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 24-25, 47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing for an
originalist constitutional interpretation). For an originalist denial of liberty rights, see
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (stating that "[tihe Court is most vulnerable
and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having
little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution"), overruled by
Lawrence v.Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
320
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of the Constitttion."323 A Thirteenth Amendment approach sidesteps
these criticisms because, instead of an intuitive assertion, it requires a
finding that an abridgement of liberty is significantly connected to the
incidents or badges of servitude.3 24
The legality of protecting liberties through the Thirteenth
Amendment is difficult to gainsay because interpreting the Amendment begins with the historical injustice it ended. My approach is
analogous to the Supreme Court's two-tiered analytic method in substantive due process cases:
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties
which are, objectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition," and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" ... . Second, we have required in substantive-due-

process cases a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Our Nation's history, legal traditions,
and practices thus provide the crucial "guideposts for responsible decisionmaking" ....

This approach tends to rein

in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due

process judicial review. 325

Similarly; courts adjudicating matters under the Thirteenth Amendment must compare contemporary harms to past practices. Once the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of involuntary servitude, the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the limitation on individual liberty is no more restrictive than is necessary to protect the
public's ability to live freely.
Protecting essential freedoms means ending coercive practices
and enabling people to make reasonable choices. Using the Thirteenth Amendment for that end would be a legitimate use of governmental power to provide for the common good. Only civic requirements, such as jury duty, public highway work, or military service

2

s John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
949 (1973); see Robert H. Bork, NeutralPrinciplesand Some FirstAmendmcnt Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 7-12 (1971) (making similar observations regarding Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965)).
324 Along similarly historical grounds, Andrew Koppelman has argued that the Thirteenth Amendment secures a woman's right to abort pregnancy. Koppelman, supra note
275. at 483.
325 Glucksberg,521 U.S. at 720-22 (internal citations omitted).
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during just war, are legitimate reasons for requiring people to act
326
against their will.
Every generation must develop an understanding of findamental
freedoms by critically examining the nation's past, its core documents,
and its moral standing as a constitutional democracy. This mode of collective self-reflection ainis at achieving empathic decision making that
avoids past injustices. Freedom is a progressive civic condition that best
expands through an affective comprehension of moral obligations and
social limitations. I take it as a given that persons are relational animals
who innately empathize and therefore can understand fellow citizens'
desire to achieve goals without coercion or arbitrary domination. Constitutional development should never come at the cost of human
autonomy and social welfare; otherwise, it would interfere with the reasonable goals of individuals' living in a community of equals. Nevertheless, some limits on freedom are necessary in organized societies where
people often have conflicting goals. Normative principles are critical to
constructing laws for a pluralistic society. To avoid religious or philosophical absolutism, the Thirteenth Amendment requires a historical
basis for asserting that an interest falls under the Amendment's purview.
Legislation against acts of domination, whether they are perpetrated during employment or in other settings, is essential in a country devoted to civil liberties. Laurence H. Tribe has pointed out that
based on existing case law
Congress possesses an almost unlimited power to protect individual rights under the Thirteenth Amendment. Seemingly, Congress is free within the broad limits of reason, to
recognize whatever rights it wishes, define the infringement
of those rights as a form of domination or subordination and
thus an aspect of slavery, and proscribe such infringement as
327
a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Likewise, the Supreme Court should adjudicate cases implicating personal liberties through the lens of the Thirteenth Amendment. In order to provide consistency and predictability to citizens and litigants,

326 See, e.g., Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 n.ll (1973) (asserting that a
compensation of $1 a day for jury duty does not amount to involuntary servitude); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918) (discussing a military draft).
327 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-15, at 926-27 (3d ed.

2000).
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both the legislature and judiciary should use a normative historical
analysis.
The Thirteenth Amendment approach can sharpen judicial decisions concerning the extent to which persons may enjoy fundamental
rights, particularly when the exercise of those rights conflicts with the
interests of other members of a pluralistic community. The basis of
such an analysis need not be ad hoc; instead, it should be based on the
recognition that slavery and involuntary servitude were inimical to
fundamental, human liberties. The woefully incomplete post-Civil War
American project involves ending racist practices. Twentieth-century
Court decisions on constitutionally protected liberty and privacy rights
reflect this trend. Those rights, however, are not absolute. To the contrary, the Thirteenth Amendment bars certain uses of freedom, particularly those used for domination. After all, in 1857, the Court favored Dred Scott's master's interest in free interstate travel with slave
property to Dred Scott's interest in freedom from slavery.328 The Thirteenth Amendment made the exploitative use of power an unconstitutional abuse of freedom.
Liberty rights are well established in United States jurisprudence.
The Court has often invoked the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause in privacy rights cases; the Court, however, has not always provided even this degree of specificity. 329 Its frequent resort to
tradition provides little explanation for the protection of fundamental
rights. 330 The Thirteenth Amendment is a more explicit guarantee of
freedom than other constitutional provisions on which the Court has
relied. For instance, Roe, upholding a woman's right to choose an
abortion, relied on the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty provision and
endorsed the district court's view that the source of that right is the
Ninth Amendment. 33 1 Although the Court in Roe did provide an expansive historical analysis to justify its conclusion, its reliance on tradition was a two-edged sword because the dissent also resorted to tradition to derive the opposite point of view on the right to abortion.3 32
328 See Dred Scott v: Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450-52 (1857). The Court concentrated both on the master's liberty and property interest. See supra text accompanying
note 42.
329 For instance, in Shapiro the Court ascribed the right to travel to "a particular constitutional provision." 394 U.S. at 630.
330 Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a ConstitutionalRight to Clone? 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 990
(2002).
331410 U.S. at 153.
332Id. at 174-77 (RehnquistJ., dissenting) (reviewing state statutes limiting abortion
which were in place in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted); see Adam B.
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Without a specific nexus on which a court must ground refer-

ences to tradition, privacy rights cases rely on the predispositions of
judges, and when racists like Chief Justice Taney sit on the Supreme
Court, decisions like Dred Scott are the product. To prevent the hijacking of tradition, the Thirteenth Amendment requires a very clear judicial analysis: Is the act an incident or badge of servitude? Or, in the
case of legislation, did Congress rationally determine that the statute
was a necessary and proper means to end an incident of servitude?
The rather obvious shortcoming of this method is that the antagonist
of a particular law or judgment can argue that it is unrelated to involuntary servitude. Such criticism does little, however, to limit the virtually plenary power that the Supreme Court found Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment grants to Congress.

33 3

Moreover, in spite of

the Amendment's specific focus, it allows for a broad reading.
Familial liberties are principal examples of how Thirteenth
Amendment analysis works outside the context of contract and property rights cases, where the Amendment has most commonly been
applied. 334 Indeed, the first use of the term "incidents of servitude,"
which Senator James Harlan of Iowa coined during the 1864 Senate
debate on the Amendment, came within the context of slavery's detriments to marriage: "[T]he prohibition of the conjugal relation is a
necessary incident of servitude." 335 If Harlan was correct, then the
federal guarantee to marry the partner of one's choice is linked to the
rights of free people. Traditionally, however, the Court has located the
right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children" in the Due
336
Process Clause.

Wolf, FundamentallyFlawed: Tradition and FundamentalRights, 57 U. MIAMI L. REv. 101, 131
(2002) ("While the majority opinion in Roe never explicitly stated that it was relying on
tradition to find the fundamental right to an abortion, its nearly twenty-page discussion of
the history of abortion precedes its finding that there is such a fundamental right."). Andrew Koppelman has argued that "[wihen women are compelled to carry and bear children, they are subjected to 'involuntary servitude' in violation of the thirteenth amendment." Koppleman, supra note 275, at 484. The Court also stated that proscriptions against
consensual homosexual conduct are constitutional, in part because they "have ancient
roots." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94. In Lawrence, the Court found this historical assertion to
have been invalid. 123 S.Ct. at 2478-79.
33 See supra text accompanying notes 167-180.
33 See generally, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976);Jones, 392 U.S. at 409.
3s5CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864).
336 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Poe, the Court
considered a challenge to a Connecticut law against the use of contraceptives and dismissed for lack of standing. Id. at 507-08.

HeinOnline -- 45 B.C. L. Rev. 372 2003-2004

2004]

Civil Rights and the Thirteenth Amendment

Choice of a marriage partner is fundamental because it reflects so
many aspects of an individual's character traits. Family rights issues provide further insight into why the Thirteenth Amendment is as relevant
to protecting civil liberties as the Due Process Clause. Both involve a
continuum of interests not subject to any "substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints." 337 Denying adults the right to family
autonomy signifies a lack of respect for the individuals' decisions, passions, hopes, and sense of self. Moreover, in this country arbitrary deprivation of family freedoms is linked to slavery.
In both the antebellum and postbellum South, slaves were degraded to a social rung below whites. Intermarriage was forbidden to
them, and even marriages between free blacks and slaves were only
permitted at the slave owners' behests. 338 A typical argument against
abolition was that it would lead to miscegenation.3 39 A back-country
farmer's attitude was typical:
[H]ow'd you like to hev a nigger steppin' up to your darter?
Of course you wouldn't; and that's the reason I wouldn't like
to hey 'em free; but I tell you, I don't think it's right to hey 'em
slaves so; that's the fac-taant right to keep 'em as they is. 340
The Supreme Court held that antimiscegenation laws violated
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses in the 1967 case of Loving v. Viginia.3 41 The Court recognized the right to marry "as one of
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men." 342 Prohibitions against intermarriage are also related to
slavery and subservience. Any arbitrary burdens placed on marriage
formation implicate the Thirteenth Amendment.
The abolition of slavery further rejected the racist stereotype that
made black families subject to personal and legislative whims. Any
337 Id. at 542-43 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
K1Arnold A. Sio, Inteipretationsof Slavery: The Slave Status in the Americas, 7 COMP. STUD.
Soc'y & HIsT. 289, 297 (1965); see William L. Ines, The Legal Status ofFree Negroes and Slaves
in Tennessee, 4J. NEGRO HIsT. 254, 262 (1919); see alsoJOHN H. RUSSELL, THE FREE NEGRO
IN VIRGINIA, 1619-1865, at 126 (Negro University Press 1969) (1913) (stating that even
after emancipation, blacks were distanced from whites by their lack of interaction and
intermarriage).
339 See Sidney Kaplan, The Miscegenation Issue in the Election of 1864, 34J. NEGRO HIST.
274, 282-83 (1949) (explaining how miscegenation became an issue against Republicans
during the 1864 national election).
340 CARL N. DEGLER, OUT OF OUR PAST- THE FORCES THAT SHAPED MODERN AMERICA
167 (1959).
341 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
342 Id. at 12.
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contemporary burdens on familial living arrangements that resemble
the hardships faced by slave families are unconstitutional. Black families in the antebellum South faced great obstacles to maintaining stable family relationships. Limits on slave families severely hampered
343
Many masters conpersonal choices and caused enormous misery.

sidered slave marriages only temporary and subject to forced termination.3 44 Because all southern states forbade blacks from entering into
formal marriage contracts, masters had an absolute right to sell one
or both spouses. When slaves married persons on other plantations or
free blacks, they were limited in how often they could visit their
spouses. Spouses who lived on different plantations were even more
likely to be sold apart than those with a common owner, and even
new masters somewhen they remained on nearby plantations, their
345
spouses.
contacting
from
times prevented them
The dominant stereotype claiming that blacks were indifferent to
family life proved groundless. 346 During and after the Civil War, many
freedpersons wandered far off plantations in search of loved ones.
Ben Dodson, a sixty-five-year-old plantation preacher, cried out in joy
when he was reunited with his wife after years of estrangement resulting from their master's decision to sell them separately: "Glory! glory!
hallalujah! Dis is my Betty, shuah," he said, glancing again at her face
to reassure himself. "I foun' you at las'. I's hunted an' hunted till I
347
track you up here. I's bonn' to hunt till I fin' you if you's alive." After emancipation, parents were reunited with children, often not rec-

3 See E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro Slave Family, 15 J. NEGRO HIST. 198, 246 (1930)
(discussing the inability of slaves to attain any civil effects of marriage).
344SeeJo Ann Manfra & Robert R. Dykstra, Serial Marriage and the Origins of the Black
Stepfamily: The Rowanty Evidence, 72J. Am.HIsT. 18, 34-35 (1985) (providing statistics indicating that force accounted for the termination of about one-third of slave marriages, and
that of those marriages that were dissolved forcefully, about one-third were unions of five
or more years, and about half produced offspring); see also JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE
SLAVE COMMUNITy: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 91 (1972) (providing
similar statistics and concluding that of 2888 slave families, 32.4% were separated forcefully within six years of their marriage).
345 Steven E. Brown, Sexuality and the Slave Community, 42 PHYLON 1, 6 (1981).
346 This dehumanizing attitude is found repeatedly in apologetics for slave trading. A
typical view was that "[w]ith regard to the separation of husbands and wives, parents and
children .....[ni egroes are themselves both perverse and comparatively indifferent about
this matter." James H. Hammond, Letter to an English Abolitionist, in THE IDEOLOGY OF SLAVERY 191-92 (Drew G. Faust ed., 1981).
347 LAURA S. HAVILAND, A WOMAN'S LIFE-WVORK 463 (Mnemosyne Publishing Co.
1969) (1881).
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ognizing each other but for a scar or some other unusual feature.3 48
Sometimes they discovered their newly found loved ones had been
brutalized during the years of slavery that separated them. One
woman located her eighteen-year-old daughter, who had been sold
from her, to have been cut "[firom her head to her feet ... just as...

49
her face."
The v-ariety of chores on big plantations also often resulted in
family separation, especially among extended family members. If one
family member worked in the plantation house, he could not live with
those members of his family who worked in the fields. The most deastating form of family disruption came from sales, which had even
less regard for extended family relationships than for parental or
0
spousal relationships. 3 5
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits such disruptions to family
structure. The Amendment complements due process jurisprudence
and expands the scope of prohibited conduct. In Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, the Supreme Court found the Due Process Clause grants
extended families the right to live together.35 1 The Court recognized
that "the institution of family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition."3 52 The Thirteenth Amendment yields added protection of this fundamental right. Pursuant to Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress can prohibit private and state interference with family living arrangements. 3 5 3
In another relevant context, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut
further guaranteed the protection of family rights. 3 54 Marriage, the

Court observed, "promotes a way of life ...a harmony of living ...

bilateral loyalty."3 55 The Court based its decision on "several constitutional guarantees" of liberties that contain "penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and sub-

348 THE AMERICAN SLAVE:

A CoMPosiTE

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

274 (George P. Rawick ed.,

1975).
349 Letter from Lucy Chase to Miss Lowell (Nov. 29, 1863), in DEAR ONES AT HoME 99
(Henry L. Swint ed., 1966).
350 See KOLCHIN, supra note 181, at 125-26.
351431 U.S. at 499.
352 Id. at 503-04.
313 The Supreme Court has never addressed the question of whether § 1982 applies to
housing exempt from the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Several lower courts have held that
housing is covered by § 1982. See Morris v Cizek, 503 F.2d 1303, 1304 (7th Cir. 1974);
Johnson v. Zaremba, 381 F. Supp. 165, 167-68 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
s54381 U.S. at 484-86.
s55Id. at 485-86.
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stance."3 5 6 In particular, the Court found a right to marital liberty in
the Due Process Clause. 357 The Connecticut anti-contraception law
it enabled the state
was an affront to the marital relationship because
358
spouses.
of
to interfere with the intimate rights
Justice William Douglas's majority opinion in Griswold has been
the subject of a variety of criticisms that would not apply to a Thirteenth Amendment approach. One critic of the decision was Justice
Hugo Black, who wrote in a dissenting opinion that the majority
based its decision on the ambiguities of procedural due process. Justice Black rejected the decision because he could "find in the Constitution no language which either specifically or implicitly grants to all
' 35 9
Similarly, Robert H.
individuals a constitutional 'right to privacy. "
test of neutral"every
failing
for
reasoning
Griswold
Bork criticized the
ity .... Giswold ...is an unprincipled decision, both in the way in
which it derives a new constitutional right and the way it defines that
right, or rather fails to define it."360
G iswold's critics, however, fail to realize that finding substantive
guarantees to family privacy does not require novel legal reasoning.
Substantive guarantees, like the First Amendment's guarantee of religious liberty and the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause's
3 61
guarantee of property rights, are strewn about the Bill of Rights.
The Thirteenth Amendment's substantive guarantee of marital freedom is another reason critics are mistaken. The liberty to choose a
spouse is grounded in its historic setting and the organic nature of
constitutional interpretation. The Thirteenth Amendment facilitates
Justice Felix Frankfurter's vision of the Constitution as a "stream of
history," which the Supreme Court directs within "a living framework"
for growth. 362 Likewise, the Amendment is compatible with Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg's view that "[a] prime part of the history of our
356Id. at

484.

See id. at 481-83.
358Id. at 480, 485-86.
359 HUGO L. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 9 (1968). Thus, he thought, the states
could invade privacy rights "unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision." Id.
360Bork, supra note 323, at 7-11.
361 See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories,
89 YALE LJ.1063, 1065 (1980) (arguing that there is a "stubbornly substantive character of
so many of the Constitution's most crucial commitments: commitments defining the values
that we as a society, acting politically, must respect. Plainly, the First Amendment's guarantee of religious liberty and its prohibition of religious establishment are substantive in this
").
sense. So, too, is the Thirteenth Amendment, in its abolition of slavery.
362 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 43 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 2 (1937).
357
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Constitution ... is the story of the extension of constitutional rights

and protections to people once ignored and excluded." 363
The Thirteenth Amendment could have further bolstered Justice

Arthur Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold, which convinc-

ingly argued that the Ninth Amendment's sweeping protection of unenumerated rights includes marital privacy rights.

364

The Amendment

unequivocally condemns laws and practices that intrude on marital
autonomy because such restrictions resemble the coercion of involuntary servitude. The Thirteenth Amendment's first section provides
the judiciary with the power to hear cases against individuals, officials,
or governmental entities who use arbitrary characteristics, such as
race, to intrude on conjugal rights. 365

The Thirteenth Amendment is relevant in other family autonomy
contexts as well. Its applicability is clear, for example, in the area of
parental autonomy over children's education. Theodore Weld, in
1839, exclaimed that enslaved parents had "as little control over [their
children] as have domestic animals over the disposal of their
young." 366 Slave parents were particularly restrained from educating
their children. Indeed, many states forbade slaves from receiving any
form of education. 367 Parents held in bondage were altogether prohibited from teaching their children to read and write. Such a practice prohibited parents from helping offspring achieve their potential
for private and public accomplishments.
As we saw earlier, the Supreme Court in Runyon v. McCrary recognized the Thirteenth Amendment's applicability to parental deciUnited States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996) (citing RICHARD MORRIS, THE
1781-1789, at 193 (1987)).
361 See 381 U.S. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
366 FRANKFURTER, supra note 362. at 2; Felix Frankfurter, Taft and the Supreme Court, in
FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT. EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND
THE CONSTITUTION 49,61 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1970).
366 WELD, supra note 76, at 56.
367 Some African Americans did learn clandestinely, many of them with the help of
sympathetic or self-interested whites. African Americans often demonstrated resourcefulness in using linguistic skills to elevate themselves from slavery and cultural prejudices. See
Kimberly Rae Connor, To Diseinbark: The Slave Narrative Tradition, 30 AFR.-AM. REV. 35, 36
(1996);Joyce E. Williams & Ron Ladd, On the Relevance of Educationfor Black Liberation,47J.
NEGRO ED. 266, 266 (1978). In the South, general education for blacks began only in 1861
in Fortress Monroe, Virginia. Ellis 0. Knox, A HistoricalSketch of Secondary Education for
Negroes, 9J. NEGRO ED. 440, 445 (1940). Masters would sometimes amputate the digits of
slaves whom they caught learning to read. Janet Cornelius, "We Slipped and Learned to
Read". Slave Accounts of the Literacy Process, 1830-1865, 44 PHYLON 171, 174 (1983). Whites
usually helped blacks, like CharityJones, who learned to read and write. Id. at 176. These
.teachers" were typically the adolescent playmates of blacks.
Id.
363

FORGING OF THE UNION,
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sions over their children's education. 368 The plaintiffs were parents
who wanted to contract for education with a private school. The
Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibited the school
369
The Court
from refuising to enroll the children on racial grounds.
concluded that parents have the liberty right to enter contractual
agreements with the school of their choosing.
The Court could have refined its reasoning with a discussion of
the disadvantages that slaves faced and the Act's liberating purposes.
Rather than basing its decision on contract rights, the Court should
have defined the universal human right to educate one's children.
After all, parents' rights go well beyond the right to contract for their
children's education and include a privacy interest in improving their
children's lives.
Indeed, a whole series of parental autonomy cases fit the Thirteenth Amendment's criteria so well as to make it plausible that courts
could find unconstitutional arbitrary restrictions on parental autonomy, even absent congressional action. This would require the Court to
recognize that Section 1 grants the judiciary deliberative powers, which,
in turn, could have significant ramifications on litigants' ability to sue
under the Amendment, especially in those circumstances where Congress has failed to address educational discrimination.
Other parental autonomy cases regarding educational issues do
rely on broad historical reasoning that the Thirteenth Amendment
can buttress. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck down a state law
that forbade teaching students a language other than English before
they finished the eighth grade. 370 The Court relied on the liberty protection of the Due Process Clause and decided the law violated the
371
parents' right to decide how to educate their children. The decision
is somewhat ambiguous because the majority did not attempt "to
372
The Court prodefine with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed."
vided a more useful criterion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, where the Court
invalidated a state law requiring children to attend school until the
age of sixteen.3 73 The Court held that the law violated Amish parents'
427 U.S. at 175-77; see supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text.
369 Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168, 172-73 (stating that the Thirteenth Amendment granted
Congress the authority to pass § 1981, which "prohibits racial discrimination in the making
and enforcement of private contracts").
3- 262 U.S. 390, 396-97, 403 (1923).
371Id. at 399-400, 403.
372 Id. at 399.
373 406 U.S. 205, 207, 213-15 (1972).
368
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rights to exercise parental control and religious authority. 374 The
Court stated that "[tihe history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children." 375 Using similar reasoning in Santosky v.
Kramet; the Court noted "[t] he findamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child." 376 And

it reiterated the "historical recognition that freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 377
The Court clothed these cases in the historical recognition that
the government must not interfere with parental decisions absent a
compelling state interest. Thirteenth Amendment analysis could better
link that aspect of American legal history to specific constitutional
landmarks. Such an analysis would reflect on the institutional denial of
parental autonomy in the antebellum United States and consider critically whether barring parents from particular educational or custody
decisions resembles the conditions of involuntary servitude. The liberation from slavery extended to all parents the freedom to make critical
decisions about their children's education. The Thirteenth Amendment
approach, then, may be even better grounded in U.S. history than the
one based on the Fourteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment
sifts through specifics rather than generalities and has the ftirther advantage of providing a cause of action against public and private schools.
I am not advocating abandoning the generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment where they are applicable. The point, rather, is
that many parental autonomy cases that typically are analyzed under
the Fourteenth Amendment could be made less vulnerable to criticism by bringing the Thirteenth Amendment's self-executing first section into the judgment or, preferably, by enacting federal family protections pursuant to the second section. 378
Id. at 232-33.
Id. at 232.
376455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
377 Id.
378 Federal family protection passed tinder the Thirteenth Amendment should focus
on private acts. The Court recently held that sovereign immunity does not shield a state
from complying with the FMLA. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1974. The Court determined that
Congress's use of its Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 power in order to prevent gender
discrimination under the FMLA was congruent or proportional to the injury the Act forbids and the means adopted to that end. Id. The Court stated:
374

3 75

Unlike the statutes at issue in City of Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett,which applied
broadly to every aspect of state employers' operations, the FMLA is narrowly

HeinOnline -- 45 B.C. L. Rev. 379 2003-2004

Boston College Law Review

[Vol.

45:307

Although greater methodological certainty makes the Thirteenth
Amendment an attractive alternative for civil rights strategists, it is not
the best alternative for all cases related to family life and reproduction.
Some cases do not fall under the Amendment's ambit, even though at
first they seem to fit it. For example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court
appropriately resorted to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to find an Oklahoma law requiring "habitual
criminals" to undergo sterilization violated their fundamental right to
procreate. 79 "We are dealing here" the majority wrote, "with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race."380 The decision remains open to critics like Bork, who criticized
the Court for failing adequately to ground the right to procreate,
thereby enabling judges to exploit "substantive equal protection" to
"embed their notions of public policy in the Constitution." 381 Bork's
criticism would be entirely inapplicable to a Thirteenth Amendment
prohibition against the arbitrary infringement of liberty rights. His textualist argument, which rests on the premise that there is no constitutional guarantee to procreate, comes undone at the infusion of Thirteenth Amendment analysis. Masters interfered with many aspects of
their slaves' procreation. They castrated slaves with relative equanimity
because it was generally considered a medical procedure that masters
could perform on chattel. 382 Further, some states permitted castration

targeted at the fault line between work and family-precisely where sex-based
overgeneralization has been and remains strongest-and affects only one aspect of the employment relationship. Also significant are the many other
limitations that Congress placed on the FMLA's scope.
Id. at 1975. The FMLA, the Court continued,
applies only to employees who have worked for the employer for at least one year
and provided 1,250 hours of service within the last 12 months, § 2611 (2) (A); and
does not apply to employees in high-ranking or sensitive positions, including
state elected officials, their staffs, and appointed policymakers, §§ 2611 (2) (B) (i)
and (3), 203(e) (2) (C)).
Id. No such restriction is applicable to the Thirteenth Amendment because it prohibits all
incidents and badges of servitude, regardless of the employer's characteristics or the time
for which a victim was exploited.
379 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942).
3
8 Id. at 541.
381 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 63-64 (1990).
38 Barbara L. Bernier, Class, Race, and Poverty: Medical Technologies and Socio-Political
Choices, 11 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 115, 121 (1994).
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as part of the punishment for black rape of white women. 38 3 Thus,
impediments to procreation interfere with a free life.
In spite of this seeming fit, the problem of using the Thirteenth
Amendment in cases like Skinner or Turner v. Safley, which found that
prisoners retain the right to marry under the Fourteenth Amendment,
is that they both dealt with prisoners' rights.3 84 Even where limiting

marriage and procreation rights has some resemblance to the incidents
of servitude, the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment does not
protect persons who have been duly convicted of crimes.

385

This is a

disturbing conclusion for human rights activism, making the Fourteenth Amendment the best means for convicted criminals to proclaim
their limited right to exercise fundamental freedoms. Further, it presents a dilemma that can be rectified only by amending the Thirteenth
Amendment's exception for the use of involuntary servitude "as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." 386
A historically based interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment
also protects liberty rights other than those linked to family relations.
Right-to-travel cases firther indicate that the Thirteenth Amendment
is a substantive guarantee of freedom. Justice William Douglas found
the right to travel abroad and within the United States was "a part of
our heritage" that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects. 387 In Kent v. Dulles, he explained the subtle nature of that right:

'Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be necessary for a
livelihood. It may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice
of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in
our scheme of values. "388 Justice Douglas did not, however, provide a
reason for finding that right in the Bill of Rights.

389

Indeed, slaves' in-

24, at 154, 156, 473.
See Turner,482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987).
8 "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
386 The Senate Committee of the judiciary, tinder the leadership of Lyman Trumbull,
borrowed the first clause of the Thirteenth Amendment from the Northwest Ordinance of
1787. SeeHORACE WHITE, THE LIFE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL 224 (1913).
387 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1958).Justice Douglas had a long-standing
commitment to civil rights. Drew S. Days III, William 0. Douglas and Civil Rights, in "HE
SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN": THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 109-17
(Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990) (documenting Justice Douglas's civil rights opinions and the
38JORDAN, supra note
3

Court's responses).
388 357 U.S. at 126.
389 See id. at 126-27.
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ability to freely travel without their masters' permission indicates that
the Fifth Amendment did not adequately protect that right.
Slaves were restricted from relocating. Even those slaves who
worked for their masters outside the homestead or plantation only
traveled at the masters' sufferance.3 90 After liberation, many blacks
wandered in the country and settled in cities away from their plantations. The newly freed people desired freedom from manacles and the
ability to live and work where they wished. Often they were financially
strapped, but preferred freedom to the security of their old homes.
This was the situation Sidney Andrews found during his travels in
3 91
1866, while reporting on the defeated South. Throughout Georgia
he found many freedpeople who were living in destitution after leaving their former homes. 3 92 "Who shall have the heart to blame them?"

Andrews asked rhetorically.3 93 "For they were in search of nothing less
noble and glorious than freedom. They were in rags and wretchedness, but the unquenchable longing of the soul for liberty was being
satisfied." 394 Andrews asked one elderly woman why she had left a mis395
tress who "would have given you a good home as long as you live."
To the freewoman the response seemed obvious, "What fur? 'Joy my
fi-eedom." 396 In another place, he found eleven people living in a hut
with rags for bedding.3 97 To Andrews's inquiry about whether he had
a berry good
a kind master, an elderly inhabitant responded, "I's 39had
8
man."
free
be
to
master, mass'r, but ye see I's wanted
Another narrative tells of an elderly slave, named Si, who left a
3 99
In the morning, the master came
plantation one night with his wife.

across Si bending down in a nearby forest by his deceased wife, who
390 Slaves who left their masters' homesteads or plantations were required to carry passes
or wear badges. Christopher Morris, The Articulation of Two Worlds: The Master-Slave Relationship Reconsidered, 85 J. AM. HIST. 982, 1000 (1998); Robert Starobin, Disciplining Industrial
Slaves in the Old South, 53 J. NEGRO HIST. 111, 114 (1968). Literate slaves wrote passes for
themselves and others, always subject to severe disciplinary measures if they were discovered.
See David Waldstreicher, Reading the Runaways: Self-Fashioning,Print Culture, and Confidence in
Slavery in the Eighteenth-Century Mid-Atlantic, 56 Wi. & MARY Q. 243, 263 (1999).
391 SIDNEY ANDREWS, THE SOUTH SINCE THE WAR 350-53 (Houghton Mifflin Co.
1971) (1866).
39 Id. at 350-51.
393Id.
394 Id. at 351-53.
395 Id.
396

ANDREWS, supra note 391, at 350-51.

397 Id.

39 Id.
399

OCTAVIA

V.

ROGERS ALBERT, HOUSE OF BONDAGE

134-35 (Oxford Univ. Press 1988)

(1890).
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had died of exposure. 4 0 "'Uncle Si, why on earth did you so cruelly
bring Aunt Cindy here for, through all of such hardship, thereby causing her death?' Lifting up his eyes and looking his master full in the
face, he answered, 'I couldn't help it, marster; but then, you see, she
401
died free.'"
After the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865,
states could no longer arbitrarily deny citizenship or access into their
borders. Senator Trumbull explained during an 1866 congressional
debate that the Thirteenth Amendment's enforcement power allowed
Congress to pass laws that would, in effect, prevent racist isolationism
in both the North and South:
It is idle to say that a man is free who cannot go and come at
pleasure, who cannot buy and sell, who cannot enforce his
rights. These are rights which the first clause of the constitutional amendment meant to secure to all; and to prevent the
very cavil which the Senator from Delaware suggests today
that Congress would not have the power to secure them, the
second section of the amendment was added. 40 2
Even after the Thirteenth Amendment's ratification, states clandestinely evaded the Amendment's grant of freedom and placed legal
barriers limiting freedpeople's movement. 403
In 1865 and 1866, all former Confederate States, except Tennessee
and Arkansas, passed sweeping vagrancy laws. 40 4 These made any poor
man who did not have a labor contract subject to discretionary arrest. 40 5 Vagrancy laws disproportionately targeted unemployed blacks
and were designed to keep them from leaving their former masters'
plantations. 40 6 Some Southern cities enacted similar ordinances designed to thwart black movement. The mayor of Mobile, Alabama
warned vagrants that if they did not find employment or leave that cit);
they would be arrested and forced to work on public streets. 407 Other
towns had similar punishments to prevent blacks from staying in urban
areas. Nashville, Tennessee and New Orleans, Louisiana sent black '%,a400Id.
401

Id.

402 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1865).
403 William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-1940: A Preliminary
Analysis, 42J. S. HIST. 31, 47 (1976).
404

Id.

405Id.

406 Id. at 33-34.
407LITWACK, supra note

181,

at 318-19.
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grants" to workhouses."4°8 San Antonio, Texas and Montgomery, Alabama required that they work on the streets to pay for the expense of
keeping them in jails. 4 °9 In a move reminiscent of the antebellum system of passes, without which slaves could not leave their masters' property, some cities arrested any blacks who stayed out on the streets after
curfew without their employer's permission. 410 This scheme was meant
as much to inhibit blacks from intrastate and interstate travel as it was
41
to perpetuate a system of involuntary servitude. '
The Court has recognized that the right to travel is "firmly established and repeatedly recognized." 412 Similar to the family privacy cases,
the Court has found support for protecting the right to travel in a Nariety of constitutional provisions, including the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and
413
the Commerce Clause.
Shapiro v. Thompson involved a state welfare-eligibility provision that
imposed a one-year residency requirement. 4 14 The Court ruled that absent a compelling interest, state interference with the fundamental
right to travel violated the Equal Protection Clause.4 15 In another case,
Saenz v. Roe, dealing with the availability of welfare benefits to persons
who recently moved to a new state, the Court ruled that prohibitions
on the right to travel violated the constitutionally guaranteed privileges
and immunities of newly arrived citizens. 416 The Court majority in
United States v. Guest found that the constitutional right to travel "and

necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate
408

Id. at 319.

409

Id.

410 Id.
411 See Amy Dru Stanley, Beggars Can't Be Choosers: Compulsion and Contract in Postbellum
America, 78J. Am. HisT. 1265, 1293 (1992) ("Under the vagrancy laws, the state enforced
the sale of labor-through an involuntary exchange-wherever beggars contrived to avoid
the natural sanctions of hunger and cold.").
412 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
4
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999) (concluding the right to travel derives from
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, section 2); Guest, 383 U.S. at 758-59
(concluding the right to travel exists in the Commerce Clause's protection of free movement); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965) (indicating the right to travel exists in the
Fifth Amendment); Twining v. NewJersey, 211 U.S. 78, 96-97 (1908) (concluding the right
to travel derives from the Fourteenth Amendment); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,
180 (1869) (concluding the right to travel derives from the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, section 2).
414394 U.S. at 629-31.
415Id. at 638; see also id. at 657 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Court basically

relies upon the equal protection ground").
416 526 U.S. at 502-03, 509-11.
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commerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept
of our Federal Union." 417 The majority linked the right to travel to the
Commerce Clause because it regarded "the constitutional right of interstate travel [as] a right secured against interference from any source
whatever, whether governmental or private .... that is quite independ-

ent of the Fourteenth Amendment." 4 18 The Court's preference for the
Commerce Clause as the source of the right to travel again artificially
linked a fundamental right to an economic power rather than to a human interest existing independently of governmental powers.
Of course, it is accurate that limits on travel can be both detrimental to commerce and violate citizens' privileges and immunities,
but, to date, the Supreme Court has inadequately examined the connection between slavery and restraints on movement. A Thirteenth
Amendment approach on the right to free travel adds a needed
reflection on whether impediments to free movement resemble the
burdens of involuntary servitude. This approach recognizes that some
extreme burdens on the right to move about freely can resemble the
constraints of enslavement.
In Griffin, v. Breckenridge, the Court nearly acknowledged the connection between the Thirteenth Amendment and right to travel, but
failed to make the logical connection between them. 419 The case dealt
with a racially motivated assault perpetrated on a public highway. 42 0 In
his opinion, Justice Potter Stewart referred to several right-to-travel
cases, including Shapiro, and found that "[o]ur cases have firmly established that the right of interstate travel is constitutionally protected,
does not necessarily rest on the Fourteenth Amendment, and is assertable against private as well as governmental interference." 421 Furthermore, Justice Stewart determined that Congress had the power to
create a cause of action against private, racially motivated conspiracies
under § 1985 (3), the Ku Klux Klan Act. 422

417 383 U.S. at 757. Justice John Harlan, who concurred in part and dissented in part
to the Guest opinion, found there was a right to travel in two constitutional provisions: "It
is
accordingly apparent that the right to unimpeded interstate travel [is] regarded as a privilege and immunity of national citizenship.... A second possible constitutional basis for
the right to move among the States without interference is the Commerce Clause." Id. at
767 (Harlan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
418 Id. at 759 n.17.
419 See generally 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
420 Id. at 89-92.
421Id. at 102, 105-06.
422 See id. at 104.
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In later years, the Court explained that "the conspiracy at issue [in
Giiffin] was actionable because it was aired at depriving the plaintiffs of
rights protected by the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to travel
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." 423 The clear indication in
Guiffin is that the right to travel and the Thirteenth Amendment granted
Congress the authority to pass the Ku Klux Klan Act, thereby providing
redress against individual conspiracies that interfere with movementeven absent a state action, negative effects on commerce, or interference
with the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. The case is
unclear, however, as to why the right to travel should be separated from
core Thirteenth Amendment interests. This dichotomy is particularly
obscure because Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act, in part, pursuant
to the Thirteenth Amendment. 42 4 The Amendment, therefore, was a
logical place for the Court to find congressional power to prohibit conspirators from interfering with citizens' right to travel.
The Court has located the right to travel in so many constitutional
provisions because, like family autonom); it is a fundamental interest
that the state must protect. The right to live free of arbitrary impediments that prevent the enjoyment of such interests sometimes implicates the protection of the Thirteenth Amendment. Securing "the
blessings of liberty" is a national aspiration to which the Preamble to
the Constitution commits the federal government. The Amendment
made that national aspiration enforceable against state and private infringements. The Amendment enhances, clarifies, and enforces contemporary civil rights decisions.
CONCLUSION

The Thirteenth Amendment continues to be a source of sweeping constitutional power for enacting federal civil rights legislation.
This Article suggests a progressive Thirteenth Amendment theory
that relies on existing precedents and abolitionist aspirations. The
Amendment drastically altered the Constitution and became the legal
causeway from slavery to freedom. 425 Its first section eliminated, or
Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1983).
Griffin established at least two constitutional bases for the Ku Klux Klan Act. Those
are the Thirteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105--07.
425 SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FArTH 139 (1988) ("The conflict of 1861,
among other things, divides our constitutional history, and some historians refer to the
'first' and 'second' Constitutions. The first Constitution-that of 1787-was predicated,
among other things, on federalism and recognition of slavery; the second Constitution, on
an enhanced national government and individual liberty.").
423 United
424
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more euphemistically amended, all the federalist provisions of the
1787 Constitution that protected slavery. The Amendment's second
section provided the U.S. Congress with the power to protect individual rights and thereby better the nation. Accordingly the Thirteenth
Amendment secured two fundamental principles, which both emanated from the Preamble. The first principle protects the right to unobtrusive autonomy in carrying out deliberative decisions. The second principle limits autonomy whenever it arbitrarily interferes with
other citizens' sense of purpose. The guarantee of freedom protects
individual choices as long as they do not infringe on the coequal liberty rights of others. This approach balances autonomy with welfare
to achieve a liberating sense of mutual purpose for civil society.
The Thirteenth Amendment, thus, not only ended slavery but
also created a substantive assurance of freedom. It prohibits all the
vestiges of involuntary slavery, whether imposed by public or private
actors, and grants Congress the right to enact laws, making "universal
liberty" a matter of national concern, not merely of state prerogative.
The Thirteenth Amendment not only secures delineated civil freedomns, such as those specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but
also secures freedom from all forms of arbitrary domination. In this
regard, legislative initiatives must balance individual liberties against
the national interests of a diverse but equally free people. The Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment provides lawmakers
with the power to craft laws tied to the Declaration of Independence's
ideal of a free and equal citizenry. The Framers of the Thirteenth
Amendment refined that idea to include persons of all races. 426

The Thirteenth Amendment's liberty guarantee is expansive
enough for each generation to abolish continued coercive practices,
not just those the Thirty-Eighth Congress recognized when it debated
the Thirteenth Amendment. Indeed, the range of liberty rights the
Thirteenth Amendment secures is just as broad as those the Due Process Clause guarantees. Accordingly Justice Harlan's description of a
broad concept of freedom in the context of the Due Process Clause
bears striking resemblance to the description of freedom his grandfa426 The

Republican Party's decision after the Civil War to use the language of the pa-

triarchal family structure helped maintain some of the unequal civil structure that existed
in antebellum U.S. See LAURA F. EDWARDS, GENDER STRIFE AND CONFUSION: THE POLIICAL CULTURE OF RECONSTRUCTION

184-85 (1997). On the decision of the women's rights
movements to move from joining race and gender issues to an insistence of specific gender
rights, see generally Ellen C. DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathe s: Equal Rights,

ioman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 1820-1878, 74J. AM. HIST. 846 (1987).
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ther expounded in the dissents to the Civil Rights Cases, Plessy v.
Feiguson,and Hodges v. United States. Our nation, Harlan wrote in dissent
to Poe v. Ullmnan, balances
respect for the liberty of the individual ... and the demands

of organized society. If the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it
certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam
where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of
which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it
developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing .... [T]he imperative character of
Constitutional provisions ... must be discerned from a particular provision's larger context .... '[L]iberty' is not a series

of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to
keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints .... 427

427 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Compare Justice Harlan's
statement from Poe with his grandfather's arguments in other dissents. For example, in the
Civil Rights Cases, his grandfather stated:

[Tihe power conferred by the thirteenth amendment does not rest upon implication or inference. Those who framed it were not ignorant of the discussion, covering many years of the country's history, as to the constitutional
power of congress to enact the fugitive slave laws of 1793 and 1850. When,
therefore, it was determined, by a change in the fundamental law, to uproot
the institution of slavery wherever it existed in this land, and to establish universalfreedom, there was a fixed purpose to place the power of congress in the
premises beyond the possibility of doubt.
109 U.S. 3, 33-34 (1883) (emphasis added) (Harlan,J., dissenting). In his dissent in Plessy,
he wrote:
The thirteenth amendment does not permit the withholding or the deprivation of any right necessarily inhering in freedom. It not only struck down the
institution of slavery as previously existing in the United States, but it prevents
the imposition of any burdens or disabilities that constitute badges of slavery
or servitude. It decreed tniversal civil freedom in this country... The sure
guaranty of the peace and security of each race is the clear, distinct, unconditional recognition by our governments, National and State, of every right that
inheres in civil freedom, and of the equality before the law of all citizens of
the United States without regard to race.
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The constitutional right to freedom, then, is linked to this country's
struggle to break with racial enslavement and to its moral growth
through the Reconstruction Amendments.
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits all repressive conduct rationally related to the impediments of freedom, not simply racist labor practices. 428 The Amendment's protections apply to anyone who
is subject to arbitrary restraints against the enjoyment of freedom.
Congress must only find that those restraints resemble the badges and
incidents of involtntary servitude. Laws passed pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment should protect free and equal persons' conceptions of, and quests for, qualitatively good lives. Masters had suppressed slaves' life aspirations, prohibiting them from entering into
marital contracts, from choosing professions, and from making a host
of other important life decisions. Slavery devalued the commitment of
our pluralistic society to respect the individual and collective right to
live free of arbitrary intrusion on freedom. Consequently, laws passed
tinder Section 2 against any badges of involuntary servitude must
make it easier for people to express their individuality and prevent
arbitrarily domineering private and state actions.
The Thirteenth Amendment's legislative process must reflect on
the nation's history to evaluate whether the U.S. has cleansed itself of
all vestiges of involuntary servitude. With those vestiges that remain,

163 U.S. 537, 555, 560 (1896) (Harlan,J., dissenting). And in Hodges, he said that the Thirteenth Amendment
conferred upon every person within the jurisdiction of the United States (except those legally imprisoned for crime) the right, without discrimination
against them on account of their race, to enjoy all the privileges that inhere
in freedom. It went further, however, and by its second section, invested Congress with power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce its provisions.... It
may be also observed that the freedom created and established by the Thirteenth Amendment was further protected against assault when the Fourteenth Amendment became a part of the supreme law of the land; for that
Amendment provided that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law. To deprive any person of a privilege inhering in the freedom ordained and established by the Thirteenth Amendment is to deprive him of a privilege inhering in the liberty recognized by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
203 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1906).
428 The Abolition Amendment freed slaves from much more than their obligation to
engage in unrequited labor. It ended all incidents of servitude such as the forced limitations on slaves' right to practice religion, hire out their labor, and leave their plantations
without permission. Cf KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE
ANTE-BELLUM SoumH 208 (1956).
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expiation must come from enacting, and then enforcing, laws rationally designed to end the oppressions.
An evolving understanding of how best to protect fundamental
rights and improve social harmony should inform congressional and
judicial interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Such an aim
comports with the Preamble's assertion that the national government's purpose is to secure the blessing of liberty and to promote the
general welfare. Civil rights laws should be passed and judged pursuant to this dual purpose of national government.
Congress thus far has done little to fulfill its role under the Thirteenth Amendment, and only a handful of cases interpret it. With only
a smattering of meaningfid laws passed to effectuate the Amendment,
its potency remains minimal but its potential is great. In spite of more
than a century of virtual neglect, the Amendment has a deep-reaching
effect on the constitutional significance of liberty.
At a time of judicial activism, which has resulted in narrowly construed congressional Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment
Section 5 powers, Jones v. Afred H. Mayer Co. and the handful of cases
it engendered remain wholly intact. Jones's ruling that the Thirteenth
Amendment grants Congress broad power to pass necessary and
proper laws rationally related to the incidents of servitude is still virtually untapped. The Thirteenth Amendment is uniquely suited for
combating contemporary infringements against civil liberties, some of
which I discuss elsewhere. 429 It reaches private acts of discrimination,
which the Rehnquist Court asserted Congress cannot regulate under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it is not subject to the
"economic enterprise" interpretation that the U.S. Supreme Court
has recently associated with the Commerce Clause.

429 Federal prohibitions against hate crimes, state use of confederate symbols, and the
enslavement of migrant farmers are some of the proposals I make in TSESis, supra note 11,
at ch. 7. See also Tsesis, supra note 3, at 545-58.
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